Do all roads lead to NATO?

Russia's incursion into Georgia is certainly a grave landmark in Post-Soviet geopolitics, but the lessons to draw from it are not so clear. An ahistorical, and slightly hysterical, understanding of events pervades the popular media. After all what is new about this 'new Russia'?

It's not at all apparent that Russia's inclinations have changed since the 1990s. It was Yeltsin's Russia that spouted fury over ex-Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic nations (let alone core ex-Soviet states) joining NATO.

If Georgia had applied to join NATO and then launched an offensive that killed Russian troops in 1998, Russia's reaction would have been similar. Putin's attitude towards former satellites is more dismissive than expansionist. Moreover, despite its military and energy resources, Russia is hardly a superpower and still needs the West.

Admittedly, Putin and Medvedev's Russia is genuinely worrying. It is an opaque authoritarian state with aggressive tendencies, and the Russian populations in neighbouring states remain a pretext for intervention elsewhere.

Ukraine is particularly vulnerable and understandably nervous, while the current situation in Georgia is intolerable. In attempting to resolve these issues there are several questions that should at least be considered.

Does Russia have a problem with democracies in its hinterland or with NATO democracies in its hinterland? Is it really an ideological dislike of democracy or is it primarily geostrategic fears of NATO.

If the former, there can be no compromise, if the latter there is room for diplomacy. In any case could NATO really help those states against Russian harassment, which can take many forms? For example, Russia could wreck Ukraine's economy without firing a shot. The response to this would have to come from the EU, not NATO.

Neutrality as model

Eastern Europeans fear another Yalta: that the West will sell them out to the Russians.

This would indeed be deplorable, but there are more positive examples from history.

During the Cold War frontline states such as Finland and Austria were neutral, democratic and genuinely independent. Could ex-Soviet states look to this model, not in terms of absolute neutrality but in settling for links with the West via the EU, which also has a security dimension but is less threatening?

To gain this voluntary 'NATO neutrality' Russia would have to help resolve the various conflicts in the region and credibly undertake to respect its neighbours' independence and territorial integrity.

The matter of missile defence would remain, as would the struggle for influence over energy supplies. And Europe would still have to confront Russia regarding human rights and other issues.

Nevertheless, such an arrangement could greatly reduce the prospect for violence, while fostering the development and security of the region.

Of course it may be that such a "grand bargain" is seen as a victory for Russia's aggressive modus operandi. If it continues harassment and interference, then its bluff has been called and the vast majority of European/NATO states would rally behind a tougher approach, including NATO enlargement.

At least meaningful diplomacy would have been tried. I am fully aware that this proposal will not appeal to many in Russia's neighbouring states, and there are many barriers to its implementation.

However, the current NATO posture is only further militarising a tense region, and exacerbating the worst tendencies of the Russian polity. Serious Europeans, East and West, should at least consider other ways of promoting democracy and security in the former Soviet states.

The author is lecturer in International Relations at School of Social Science and Law University of Plymouth