Advice to the Tories on dealing with Germany

If there is one thing the German political class dislikes, it is unknown quantities. To articulate grandiose politico-strategic goals or to engage in ad-hoc muddling-through would simply invite unforeseen attack. Considerable resources are therefore expended upon rationalising and exploring and mapping out policy options.

If there is one thing the British political class enjoys, it is unknown quantities. Rationalising and exploring and mapping out policy options simply cuts down the scope for political manoeuvring. To proclaim a grand-sounding goal and follow it up with a bout of muddling-through is the daily bread of British politics.

So much for the stereotypes. But these vignettes might well shed light on the difficulties of successive British and German governments to work together on European affairs. And, if recent reports of Berlin's concerns about the possibility of Conservative electoral victory this year are anything to go by, this pattern will not be broken by a change of government in London.

Tensions between Berlin and the Conservative leadership persist despite an apparent softening of the Tory tone on Europe. In November 2009, David Cameron replaced his pledge to hold a retrospective referendum on the Lisbon Treaty with a series of vague commitments to shore up British sovereignty. This bout of euro-pragmatism from an increasingly sceptical party might be expected to receive a cautious welcome in Germany. It did not. Why so?

A "pragmatic" Conservative policy is still worlds away from German ideas about how European co-operation should function. The talk in the policy plan of a repatriation of British competences in social policy gives rise to concerns about social dumping as well as about the party's ideas regarding the malleability of EU law.

Yet the continued tension between the two also comes down to differences in political style - the one side's relish for unknown quantities and the other's instinctive dislike of them. To deal with these differences of style would require a response at odds with received wisdom.

The lack of detailed thinking in Cameron's policy plan was key to its domestic success: It placated the sceptics in the Conservative party whilst denying them real leverage over future policy. However, its naming of a grand-sounding political goal, to be followed up with ad-hoc muddling-through, might almost have been designed to torment Berlin.

The dearth of detail in the policy plan opens a Pandora's box of unknown quantities for the German government: a Conservative demand for a substantial repatriation of competences would almost inevitably be echoed elsewhere by other member states. They too would demand a repatriation of powers. Where would it stop? What signal do these demands send about the robustness of EU rules?

If the Conservative leadership wishes to allay continental concerns, it could usefully break with habit and engage in some rationalising and mapping and thinking about the effect its demands would have upon the stability of the union.

If it really chooses to pursue a policy of repatriation, the Conservative leadership could suggest the core policies to which all EU members would in future have to adhere and those very few in which looser forms of co-operation would be possible.

Alternatively, the leadership could revisit plans for two-tier EU membership, with full and partial members. The few partial members would enjoy greater flexibility in their relations with Europe but would also incur political and financial costs as a result.

Of course, even with the question of Turkish accession to the EU firmly on the agenda following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, Berlin will still be dead against this kind of a-la-carte EU membership for current members. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how such a set up might be practically achieved.

Yet, even if Berlin does not like the contents of the message, it might at least appreciate its style. By setting out clear limits to demands for a repatriation of powers, the Conservatives would show that they are alive to continental fears and not a party "afflicted by autism." This at least could render what is still in essence an internal party debate more palatable to onlookers.

There is also scope for Germany to act. Any instinctive disinclination to propose a politico-strategic agenda for the EU can only be increased by the depth of euroscepticism in the UK and understandable fears of a hostile reaction there.

And yet, British eurosceptics could well prove receptive to some ambitious politico-strategic goals. A retreat into cautious mapping and exploring and rationalising hardly communicates confidence in the EU to sceptical publics and politicians in the UK and elsewhere.

For one thing, Berlin and other proponents of the Lisbon Treaty must explain what use is being made of the EU's new institutional architecture. Better to set out a clear agenda for the EU's new foreign policy apparatus, for example, than give rise to the suspicion that European institutionalisation is pursued as an end in itself. The Conservatives themselves have been vocal - even expansive - in their ideas about the EU's global role.

Finally, if Germany and its European partners wish to show the eurosceptics that European co-operation is less about amplifying narrow national interests unadulterated than about reaching compromises in pursuit of higher common goals, they need at least to be able to name these common goals.

The writer is head of office at the Brussels bureau of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs