[Comment] Why America's Russia policy runs through Ireland
RYAN KOSLOSKY
24.02.2009 @ 17:35 CET
EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - The cutoff of gas supplies to Ukraine by Russian gas giant Gazprom is not an acute crisis among embittered neighbours. Nor is Russia's heightened tensions with the United States a mere tiff in the history of their diplomatic relations. Rather, they more symptomatic of strained relations between a resurgent Russia and an energy-dependent West.
"Having a diplomatically weak EU vis-a-vis Russia also strengthens Russia's position with respect to the United States" (Photo: gazprom.ru)
Oil is the mainstay of the Russian economy. Russia has the earth largest known natural gas reserves and recently surpassed Saudi Arabia as the world's largest producer of oil. The pipeline system running out of the Caspian basin reflects the old Soviet bureaucratic hierarchy. Most pipes run south to north as Moscow was the center of the Soviet sphere of influence.
Thus, Russia is in a unique geostrategic position to exert influence on oil and gas prices. Russian strategy can be separated into two distinct components. In a two part strategy, the Russian government has consolidated its energy industry under its control, and now seeks to use it as a tool of its regional strategy.
The Yukos liquidation, the government taking a controlling interest in Gazprom, and Gazprom's purchase of 73 percent of Sibneft were all steps by which the Russian government has prevented foreign interests from taking a stake in Russian oil and gas.
Indeed, one cannot disentangle the Russian oil industry - and now by extension its economy - from its foreign policy. Russia's arms shipments to Iran, conflict in the Caucuses, and its energy brinkmanship with Ukraine all increase oil's risk premium and revenue flowing into Russian coffers.
Yet much of this policy relies on a divide-and-conquer strategy. Russia seeks to create asymmetric interdependence via energy politics. That others need Russia more than Russia needs others improves its position in the region. It does so by concluding a series of bilateral agreements between EU member states rather than negotiating with the EU as a whole.
Having a diplomatically weak EU vis-a-vis Russia also strengthens Russia's position with respect to the United States. The cycle of heightening tensions between Russia and the US over NATO defense posturing can only churn between nations with relative power parity. Thus a successful regional policy depends on uniting the varying interests of EU members and, second, aligning US and European diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Russia.
Part of the problem is institutional. Strengthening the mechanism by which foreign relations are conducted is an essential component of reverse-triangulating Russian diplomacy. A major blow toward this end was dealt by the Irish electorate in its rejection of the Lisbon treaty.
Lisbon's reforms
The Lisbon treaty is one of the most comprehensive institutional reforms that EU has every attempted. Much of the Treaty is devoted to reforming how the foreign policy of the EU is conducted. It makes three relevant changes.
To begin the treaty merges the posts of European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new post - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy - would foster greater consistency and uniformity with regard to EU diplomacy and foreign affairs.
Second, the Lisbon treaty would change the office of the President of the European Council. Rather than rotate every six months, the Council President would now be elected for a two and a half year term. Moreover, Article 15 (5) charges the President with ensuring the "external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy." It also mandates that when conducting foreign relations the President cannot "prejudice" the powers of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs.
Lastly, the Lisbon treaty eliminates the pillar system of the EU. Currently each of the pillars of the EU has their own legal personality. Should Lisbon pass, the EU itself would have its own legal personality rather than its various components.
Vested interest
Ireland's rejection of Lisbon is not without precedence; Irish voters also rejected the Nice treaty in June 2001. The numbers now suggest that there is a good possibility that Lisbon can be saved. In 2001, only 34.8 percent of the Irish electorate voted in the referendum. In 2008 it was 53.1 percent. However, both the Nice and Lisbon treaties were rejected by similar margins, 53.9 percent and 53.4 percent, respectively.
After the initial rejection of Nice, a massive and sustained pro-Nice campaign resulted in Nice being ratified by the electorate with 63 percent in favor of ratification. Moreover, turnout increased to around 50 percent.
However, a pro-Lisbon campaign will likely be comparatively more difficult than the 2002 Nice referendum considering the relative vote turnout. Thus the emphasis of a pro-Lisbon campaign must not be focused solely on turning out support but also on educating the public.
Opinion polls in the spring of 2008 consistently showed public support in favor of Lisbon up to its July referendum. However, the polls also showed a significant proportion of respondents not understanding the treaty. This was also reflected in exit polling. Of those who voted against the treaty, 40 percent said they did not understand the Lisbon text.
Thus an educational and political campaign similar to that of the successful 2002 Nice referendum may prove successful. The Obama administration has a vested interest in the outcome of such a campaign as it may prove dispositive of how negotiations with Russia unfold in the future. President Obama has widespread favorability in Europe and targeting a message toward the Irish public on why a strong EU is in both Ireland's and the United States' interests may prove beneficial to American's long-term Russia policy.
The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Human Rights, Peace, and Development, University of Florida
