Opinion
The will to power
By Peter Belk
The Georgian war has exposed hard facts for the West and the Russian Federation. Tbilisi should have given pause before pushing tensions in South Ossetia to the brink with Moscow, given the tepid support for Georgia's entrance in the European Union and NATO.
It remains to be seen what of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's cease-fire is actually in effect and if Russian President Dimitri Medvedev can follow through on his assurances to stop hostilities. Still, while much remains in flux, we should be mindful to take away some immediate lessons learned.
The western bluff is called
Join EUobserver today
Get the EU news that really matters
Instant access to all articles — and 20 years of archives. 14-day free trial.
Choose your plan
... or subscribe as a group
Already a member?
Tbilisi should have known that European capitals, NATO (and the United States) would not thwart a sustained military effort by the Russian Federation in Georgia.
While Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are clearly closer in alignment with the United States with respect to Russia than their predecessors, neither is as bullish as the US would like or Georgia would need. No European capital was willing to meet the military challenge from the Russian Federation, all the more so given Europe's increased sense of dependence on Russian energy supplies.
Even more troublesome for Europe, though, had Georgia been admitted to NATO and the Russians moved, it is uncertain whether NATO would have responded, further undermining the credibility of organization whose standing is already under siege in Afghanistan.
Medvedev's moment?
For the Russian Federation, the move in Georgia is a bold, audacious step.
Moscow has made it abundantly clear that it will assert its strategic interests in its near abroad. Further, on the heels of what it perceives as the loss of Kosovo, the push for a missile defence shield (now made possible by the sudden turn of the screw in Warsaw) literally on the border of the Russian Federation, Moscow believed that it must push back. Nevertheless, some serious questions have emerged, with the most fundamental one being: who is in charge in Moscow?
After months of carefully staging an independent platform from which to base his presidency, Medvedev is on the sidelines. World leaders have turned to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin for answers on Russia's current behaviour. Under Russian law, the division of labour between the President and Prime Minister is unambiguous: the President is supreme on matters of military action and foreign policy.
The obvious implication is that the Russian Federation has significantly damaged its credibility regarding the transition of power and predictability under the rule of law. Moscow has made a seemingly unpredictable political and bureaucratic operating environment seem all the more so unpredictable. While there is little that European capitals governments can do, one thing is certain: the marketplace can and will react.
Since the crisis began, Russian markets have seen increasing nervousness from international investors. Russia's credit rating has been downgraded and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is already warning about the prospects of reduced capital inflows into the country. While the West has few military sticks it can or is willing to wield, European capitals (in conjunction with the United States) can become extremely obstinate with respect to Russia's prospects at clearing the final hurdles for accession to the World Trade Organization and even jeopardize the Russian Federations' participation in the G-8 (which would be far more effective than a mad rush to include Ukraine into NATO, as some suggest).
Implications for the future: Iran
If it is not obvious, it should be: the 800-pound gorilla in the room for the West and the Russian Federation is Iran. While the current tensions in Georgia should not be underestimated, the stakes involved pale in comparison to the crisis that will unfold should Iran's intransigence continue and the West and the Russian Federation fail to find an accommodation on Iran. With this in mind, there are some important comparisons to be made between the Georgian crisis and the crisis to come with Iran.
While recent German and French bluster regarding the Russian threat to democracy may be attractive public rhetoric, these sentiments should remain secondary to the critical issues of halting Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's continued state sponsorship for terrorism. Further, it is important the European Union and NATO have the means to follow through on the economic and potential military consequences to the Iranian threat.
For the Russian Federation, it is important to remember that Iran is not the near abroad, has none of the natural ethnic or historical context countries that Ukraine and Georgia have and that the stakes for Russia itself are higher should Iran's ambitions continue to go unchallenged. A more cooperative stance by Moscow will help differentiate its legitimate strategic interests against being obstinate and uncooperative. Finally, should Medvedev take a more active involvement in moving the process forward, it would help a great deal to demonstrate to the West his authority.
How the crisis in Georgia will ultimately unfold, as well as its aftermath, remains an open question. But European capitals and Moscow should be looking for some immediate takeaways as they look for the material challenges that will certainly follow.
The author formerly served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the US Department of State.
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this opinion piece are the author's, not those of EUobserver.