The clearest response to this has been a US decision to create a new military command for the continent – a US Africa Command, or "AFRICOM." But this initiative represents a serious challenge to Europe.

Regional commands are an outgrowth of the United States' global role following World War II. Although organized by the military, the commands typically are a focal point for all US government interactions within a region. Currently, the Defense Department coordinates its worldwide affairs using five regional commands: US Northern Command and US Southern Command for North and South America plus the Caribbean; US Central Command for the Middle East, parts of Central Asia and the Horn of Africa; US European Command for Europe and much of sub-Saharan Africa; and US Pacific Command for East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Dana Priest compared the 4-star military officers who lead the commands to Roman Proconsuls during the Roman Empire, given their military, and sometimes, pseudo-political representational role.

The main focus of AFRICOM will, however, not be military operations; rather, it will emphasise training programmes, civil affairs and the professionalisation of African armed forces. AFRICOM's chief, General William Ward, told Congress: "We will work to support ongoing US government efforts while finding additional ways to improve security-related programs." His civilian colleague, Ryan Henry, echoed this: "There are no new (military) bases envisaged in AFRICOM and there are no new combat troops".

Three challenges

But that said, and while many issues about AFRICOM have yet to be resolved, including staffing, funding and location, the initiative represents a three-fold challenge to Europe.

First, it represents a challenge to Europe's desire – whether through NATO or the European Union – to support the development of the African Union's security capabilities. In 2004, the EU set-up the African Peace Facility (APF): a €250m development instrument requested by the AU that supports African peace operations and capacity building (recently increased by €50m with a pledge to provide a further €300m for the period 2008-10). The EU also provided air-lift to the AU mission in Darfur and pledged €15m to help finance the peacekeeping force.

But this funding is likely to be dwarfed by AFRICOM and associated security assistance programmes in the Pentagon: a five-year, $ 660 million initiative – much of it likely to go to Africa – has already been proposed to Congress.

Second, AFRICOM's likely approach risks challenging "best practice" for security assistance, championed by the EU. This holds that rather than supply training or equipment, the appropriate way to assist the build-up of security capabilities in developing countries is through a comprehensive process that addresses the policy, legislative, structural and oversight issues so that democratic norms and principles are respected.

The alternative risks building powerful security institutions – armies and police forces – without the necessary oversight, and can lead to "militarization" of the society.

For a series of statutory reasons, the US has only a limited ability to engage in this kind of holistic security sector reform with the military particularly ill-equipped to undertake the range of tasks required. Therefore, the US relies on private companies and focuses mainly on the provision of training and equipment. It is hard to see how AFRCIOM will change this approach in the short term. The result may therefore be more operational assistance – training and equipment.

Third, and most disconcertingly, is providing AFRICOM with the kind of "walking-around cash" that US commanders have been allocated in Iraq, (called Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERPS)) and which have been mooted for AFRICOM carry risks.

Quick-impact assistance can in certain circumstances – especially in post-conflict environments – create short-term gains, win a "few hearts and minds", but is unlikely to create sustainable or poverty-alleviating growth. In fact, it may put off the necessary reforms to indigenous and sustainable development. For this reason, the OECD, long supported by its European caucus, has been pushing for "host-nations" – the developing countries themselves – to lead their own development.

Has anyone seen Europe?

In sum, AFRICOM may represent a serious challenge to Europe's security interests in Africa, at a time when other non-traditional donors, such as China and Venezuela, are increasing their presence on the continent and undermining the kind of "best practice" that more traditional donors, like the UN, EU and bilateral agencies, have developed.

Unfortunately, Europe's reaction to this initiative – and its associated risks - has been studied silence. Even though a number of militaries have seconded planners to the putative AFRICOM established under EUSERER in Stuttgart, there has been no debate about the larger questions. Development agencies – from UK's DfiD to the Commission – seem to be ignoring AFRICOM entirely.

Let us be clear: AFRICOM will be stood up, and will bring much-need support. The Darfur case shows that African forces need more hardware and assets than European aid can currently supply. And Europe should not – could not –establish competing security links. This would only risks duplicating efforts and, at worst, driving the quality of assistance down.

But instead of developing a stand-alone US command, perhaps the US and NATO's European countries could collaborate in establishing a NATO command – Joint Force Command Africa. There is room for a more muscular approach to African capacity-building that nonetheless has a far stronger governance/political core to it than the current US approach. An ideal case, then, where Europe and the US can learn from – and support – each other.

Daniel Korski is a Senior Fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations (www.ecfr.eu).