Opinion
Russia's energy weapon is backfiring
The recent energy dispute between Russia and Belarus has raised further worrying questions about Russia's reliability as an energy supplier and given fresh impetus to discussions about the need for the European Union to frame a common energy policy.
The alarm bells first rang a year ago following the Kremlin's heavy-handed decision to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine. This caused temporary gas shortages in parts of Western Europe and for the first time forced its citizens and politicians to consider the implications of Russia's willingness to use energy as a weapon.
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For Russia's neighbours, energy insecurity and threat of disruption of supplies as a means of exerting political or economic pressure is unfortunately nothing new. Russia has been using its energy weapon quite openly since the beginning of the 1990s. A recent study by Robert L. Larsson from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) shows that there have been 35 similar supply interruptions in the last sixteen years. The countries mostly affected have been Lithuania, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
There are several reasons why Russia has been pushing hard on energy. First and foremost, the Kremlin sees energy dominance as a way of restoring Russia's international influence, which was largely lost by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is encouraged in this belief by the fact that rapid growth of energy demand, together with increasing western energy dependency, has made gas and oil producing countries more visible and influential in world affairs.
The second reason is Russia's deep identity crisis, which borrows from the Soviet and Tsarist eras to create a model of national revival that is sharply at odds with liberal democratic norms. To a large extent, the revenues from energy export are being invested in structures of political management and control that are wholly at odds with widely recognised European values.
The same motive determines its approach in the "near abroad." The use of energy as a political pressure tool against Georgia and Ukraine must be understood primarily as a response to the Rose and the Orange revolutions. Members of Putin's administration openly oppose the efforts of Tbilisi and Kiev to create more open and democratic societies on the European model, seeing those changes as a direct threat to Russia's interests.
Russia's intention to use energy cut-offs for political gain might however be very short-sighted, especially if Germany, which currently holds the rotating, six-month presidency of the European Union, honours its commitment to put an end to an insecure situation for European energy consumers and genuinely tries to broker a deal among other EU countries to deal with Russia with a single voice.
Last month, the European Commission presented its latest EU Energy Policy Review. While any progress towards a common policy is very welcome, coming as it did in the midst of the dispute between Moscow and Minsk, the Commission's recommendations fail to give adequate consideration to the question of how Europe can guarantee external security of supply.
There are ambitious proposals on ownership unbundling and diversification of energy supply that, if implemented, will certainly help Europe to manage its resources more efficiently. The Commission has even gone so far as to acknowledge the importance of the Energy Charter Treaty, the main multilateral framework governing energy cooperation, which is as binding for Russia as it is for all other signatory countries. Is this enough to guarantee energy security and best value for the consumer? Certainly by now European leaders ought to have realised that Russia will not be a reliable partner unless it accepts it obligations under the Treaty and signs its Transit protocol.
It is time for the European leaders to face up to their responsibilities by developing an energy relationship with Russia based on fair and legally binding rules that respect normal commercial standards. To achieve this the EU's 27 member states need to replace their current preference for energy unilateralism with a new policy of energy solidarity. It is only by acting collectively that Europe can hope to deal with Moscow on even terms.
If the EU had the vision and political will to develop an energy strategy based on real reciprocity with Russia, then Moscow would begin to think twice before using energy as a form of blackmail. Instead it would come to understand that as a prospective WTO member it had more to gain by respecting the rules and providing energy on a normal commercial basis.
Marko Mihkelson is a member of the parliament of Estonia and rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe on the "Perils of using energy supply as an instrument of political pressure"
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this opinion piece are the author's, not those of EUobserver.