What next for the protests in Serbia?

For three months, tens of thousands of citizens, led by students from all over Serbia, have protested throughout the country. They constitute the most serious challenge to the 13-year rule of Aleksandar Vučić. 

The real question is how these protests can lead to change in Serbia.

The protests have clearly defined demands: they seek a legal process against those responsible for the collapse of the canopy at the Novi Sad train station, the release of all documents, the investigation into the attacks against the students, and more funding for universities.

While the students did not explicitly demand resignations or new elections, the ruling party and president Vučić have responded with resignations and other measures outside the institutions' functioning.

Thus, the president offers solutions reinforcing his extra-constitutional power and a political response, whereas the students demand an institutional response. 

The four demands raised by Serbian students can be summarised into one fundamental call: they seek accountability from their government and the reinstatement of the rule of law.

Over the past 13 years of the Serbian Progressive Party rule, systemic corruption has eroded the rule of law, transforming key institutions into mere tools for those in power. Elections have been marred by irregularities, leaving no realistic opportunity for the opposition to gain power through democratic means.

State-run media serve as a mouthpiece for the ruling party, and the police and intelligence services target civil society organisations unlawfully.

In this climate, the restoration of a functioning rule of law — one that holds government officials accountable, limits their power and ensures legal checks and balances — is essential not only for democracy but for any semblance of political normalcy.

After months of the protests, Vučić wants to give the appearance of fulfilling the demands — at least to his voters — without fulfilling them. As Serbia is at an impasse, the possible scenarios arise.

Currently, there is little chance of intense pressure from the outside. While the regime keeps suggesting that Western intelligence agencies support the protests and have been warning of so-called ‘coloured revolutions’, the demonstrators have not received any Western support. 

The government, on the other hand, did. The US under Trump has supported Vučić, as the messages from Trump’s special envoy, Richard Grenell, indicate. 

The EU's messages have not been much different. The support is partially grounded in the false yearning for "stability", as EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas recently stated. Enlargement commissioner Marta Kos's letter on the protests avoided taking a clear position. 

Member states have made lucrative deals with the regime.

This includes the sale of French fighter jets to Serbia in 2024 and the lithium mining project by Rio Tinto, which has received strong support from Germany. This does not mean that their support is inevitable.

If the protests fail, Serbia will not continue with business as usual, but the regime will become more authoritarian and citizens’ distrust will not disappear. Thus, the stability which motivates EU passivity is completely elusive

But the EU is likely to act only if the regime either increases repression or if there are apparent fissures in the regime. Russia and China are staunch supporters of the regime and dislike citizens expressing their opinions anyhow. 

While the students rightfully demand that the institutions operate according to the constitution, they will not do so without the president’s blessing.

Regime collapse?

Vučić might fulfil the student protests' demands, but after months of foot-dragging and attacking the protestors, there is little confidence that the regime’s concessions can defuse the protests.

Furthermore, even if the demands were met, the structural problem remains. The regime of SNS and Vučić is fundamentally undemocratic and cannot restore the rule of law without threatening itself. 

Unless Vučić makes a mistake, the system will only collapse if part of the power structure around Vučić shifts loyalties. This will be tricky. The current regime is highly personalised, making maneuvering an elite split difficult. 

Without external support or apparent allies within the institutions, a political process must emerge that brings a united opposition and a clear path. Despite a short period of cooperation ahead of the 2023 elections, this process has been fragmented. 

A way forward could draw from the experience in North Macedonia in 2015/6, where an EU-mediated agreement brought in a caretaker government that prepared the country for elections and included representatives from the opposition and the ruling party.

However, this path was only possible with outside assistance, which is currently unlikely.

Nevertheless, such a political path out of the crisis appears to be the only direction in which the current protests can transform their demands into lasting change.

If the protests fail, Serbia will not continue with business as usual, but the regime will become more authoritarian and citizens’ distrust will not disappear. Thus, the stability which motivates EU passivity is completely elusive.