In April, Uganda’s Constitutional Court upheld the 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA). The law has been widely condemned for broad and vaguely worded provisions and brutal penalties.
So-called “aggravated homosexuality,” including some adult consensual sex, could be punished with death and someone found guilty of “homosexual acts” faces life imprisonment.
Legitimate public health and human rights work risks 20 years in prison for the “promotion” of homosexuality.
In response, the World Bank suspended all lending to Uganda and is now attempting to roll out some mitigation measures which remain untested. The US government issued targeted individual and trade sanctions, and reallocated some health sector funding.
In contrast, the EU delegation released the weakest statement possible, largely focused on “regret” for the death penalty. A statement issued by international corporations, including Google, Microsoft and Mastercard, was more condemnatory and reflected a deep understanding of the pernicious economic impact of discrimination.
Despite the AHA’s codified discrimination and violence, the EU has highlighted Uganda as a hub for European money with renewed vigour. The European Commission undertook a major initiative to fund €200m business investment in Uganda and provided a platform to the same Ugandan leaders who supported and enforced the AHA.
Despite ample evidence of increasing authoritarianism in Uganda, the EU now focuses on “playing nice.”
It is counterproductive and harmful both to the EU’s reputation as a leader in protecting basic human rights and to Uganda’s own governance and stability. With Uganda’s elections scheduled for early 2026, the EU should revise their approach.
The AHA is the latest example of abuse and autocracy of president Yoweri Museveni’s government. Extrajudicial killings of civilians exercising their rights to free assembly and expression recurs each election with no accountability, while space for political opposition and civil society is largely nonexistent in practice, and government corruption continues unabated.
Last week, Ugandan forces arrested longstanding opposition figure Kiiza Besigye in Kenya, and charged him with crimes before Uganda’s military courts.
In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and an increasingly multipolar world, the EU’s foreign policy approach has been described as a 'geopolitical turn,' in which it primarily seeks to defend its geopolitical interests – for example in a competition with Russia and China in Africa.
And indeed, Russia has increasingly been looking for influence in Uganda, for example by sponsoring a pan-African anti-LGBT conference, in order to stoke anti-Western feelings.
Consequently, emphasising human rights has become less important in the EU’s foreign policy. This is also what happened in Uganda — an evolution, we argue, is ultimately harmful to the EU’s own interests and Ugandan citizens.
Particularly since new EU leadership arrived in Kampala in September 2022 — an ambassador and political head — the EU appears to prioritise “mutual benefits” of partnership despite risking actual or perceived complicity in abuses of the Museveni regime.
The EU seems to think it is getting what diplomats call a 'seat at the table' – or rather the possibility of leveraging their views with Ugandan government officials. Likely not true and to what end?
While this tactic might work with democratic governments, where rule-based order offers a degree of predictability and checks and balances against abuses, that is not Uganda where power is highly personalised, and where the 'first family' monopolises power and money.
In these circumstances, the EU opting to 'play nice' strengthens Uganda’s authoritarian dynamics.
The EU plays direct and indirect roles in these dynamics via aid, investment and diplomacy. Questions of how the EU should engage are critical because of Uganda’s future ‘transition’.
Museveni has ruled since 1986 and is now at least 80 years old. With no developed democratic space, and ever-growing patronage and corruption, Ugandans have justifiable concerns for how any transition may unfold. Factors culminating in some future transition – however it may come to pass – have been compared to ‘walking towards a cliff’.
The EU’s attitude towards Museveni’s son Muhoozi Kainerugaba is especially troublesome. Muhoozi rapidly rose through the army ranks and is currently the chief of defence forces.
The regime often promotes Muhoozi as heir apparent to his father, but Muhoozi remains controversial. His X rants have made him (in)famous worldwide – in October 2022, for example, he boasted it would only take him two weeks to take over Nairobi. He is also accused of torture.
If Muhoozi becomes president, consequences are unpredictable.
Recently, EU ambassadors have openly published photos alongside Muhoozi. The EU deputy ambassador even complimented Muhoozi on X for his fashion, dubbed “absolute swag.”
Such superficialities are damaging; they strengthen Muhoozi’s position by granting him international standing, and further entrench the perception of his influence. According to one analyst, “every time he puts out a Tweet with an ambassador, it further sends the message: Don’t speak out against Muhoozi; he’ll be the next president.”
If the EU gains any leverage by these tactics, it’s to the detriment of Uganda’s citizens.
The EU’s deputy ambassador recently shared their logic for failing to have a substantial response to the AHA. Post-AHA-related human rights violations, he stated, were “not assessed” to be “widespread and systematic.”
This summarises the limits of the approach: to maintain the regime’s ear, the EU willfully ignores the complexity of local dynamics where one risks one’s life to document such violations.
All of this results in EU policy which, as written elsewhere, is misguided and fails to contribute to the potential for a democratic Uganda where governance is uncoupled from the Museveni family. Ugandan and EU citizens deserve better.
Maria Burnett is a human rights lawyer and a senior associate (non resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She was previously the East Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
Kristof Titeca is a professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp, and a senior associate at Egmont institute. He has worked on governance dynamics in Uganda for the last 20 years.
Maria Burnett is a human rights lawyer and a senior associate (non resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She was previously the East Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
Kristof Titeca is a professor at the Institute of Development Policy, University of Antwerp, and a senior associate at Egmont institute. He has worked on governance dynamics in Uganda for the last 20 years.