Seizing all $300bn [€277bn] of Russia’s frozen state assets and transferring them to Ukraine is disregarded as nearly impossible by the EU.
Consequently, we have ended up with a disappointing compromise. At the recent G7 summit in Italy, leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a $50bn loan backed by the interest earned from the frozen assets.
It is better than nothing, but pales in comparison to the assets’ game-changing scale.
While the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and others are pushing for the full seizure of Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine, some European officials worry about setting a controversial legal precedent. It is not just that Russia could sue us for a perceived violation of international law, they claim.
If we alter the law to confiscate the assets, other countries could launch counter restrictive or retrospective legal actions which could undermine the EU as a defender of the rule of law.
Other European officials highlight potential economic retaliation — particularly from China and Saudi Arabia — as the main reason to refrain from confiscating Russia’s frozen assets. Whether in the form of direct retaliation against large EU member states such as France and Germany, or by withdrawing state assets from European banks, some European officials fear that retaliatory steps could undermine the euro as a reserve currency and threaten Europe’s economic stability.
But while Xi Jinping has professed a “no-limits” friendship with Vladimir Putin, an economic confrontation with Europe would be a significant gamble for Beijing. For those who have not professed support for Russia’s illegal war, Saudi Arabia among them, retaliation would represent a major escalation.
Let us be clear: confiscating frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine would safeguard international law — not break it. And in not confiscating the frozen assets, Europe is rendering perceived economic interests more important than the international law it claims to protect.
Russia has blatantly violated international law every single day since the beginning of Putin’s illegal war. This clear violation was recognized by the UN General Assembly on 14 November 2022, and by the International Court of Justice on 31 January 2024 in its binding preliminary ruling that Russia must bear all legal consequences of its wrongful acts — including paying reparations for the damage caused by the war.
In a detailed report by the European Parliamentary Research Service, "confiscation based on third-party countermeasures with a conditional element" and "confiscation based on the enforcement of international judgments against Russia" are deemed consistent with international law.
Even if a country does not currently have existing legal mechanisms to confiscate frozen Russian assets, new measures can certainly be legislated. Canada did so in 2022, and the United States followed suit earlier this year.
Behind closed doors, some European officials argue that the West can leverage the frozen assets to entice Putin to end the war, under the assumption that they would be unfrozen once the war is over. But the West must remember that Putin has been willing to suffer huge economic losses and put Russia’s entire economy on a war footing just to continue the invasion.
Money has no influence over Putin’s decision-making. On the contrary, it is Europe that seemingly bends to economic threats.
Even once the war ends, Putin’s regime is highly unlikely to voluntarily compensate Ukraine as international law commands. Confiscation of Russia’s frozen assets is the only measure that would even begin to approach the costs of Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction. It will be either Russia or Western taxpayers that will foot most of the bill.
The arguments against confiscating the Russian state assets are based more on fear than reality. Steps by Western governments to seize frozen Russian assets would be made on solid legal, logical, and moral grounds — and governments can adopt new legal precautions against counterclaims where necessary.
Western leaders must demonstrate that international law is not just symbolic, but a set of rules under which those who break them are held responsible — regardless of economic interests.
Ukraine’s allies must finally demonstrate to Putin — and other potential aggressors — that the free world is ready to use all measures possible to bring Russia to justice and defend the rule of law.
Olena Sotnyk is a lawyer, senior representative for Rasmussen Global political consultancy in Ukraine, advisor to the deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and a former MP in Ukraine from 2014-2019. She has a background in international law, human rights, and security studies. Celine la Cour is a project manager at Rasmussen Global based in Brussels. She formerly worked for the Danish government and the EEAS and has an educational background in international relations and conflict resolution.
Olena Sotnyk is a lawyer, senior representative for Rasmussen Global political consultancy in Ukraine, advisor to the deputy prime minister of Ukraine, and a former MP in Ukraine from 2014-2019. She has a background in international law, human rights, and security studies. Celine la Cour is a project manager at Rasmussen Global based in Brussels. She formerly worked for the Danish government and the EEAS and has an educational background in international relations and conflict resolution.