Europe is rearming. Defence budgets are rising, stockpiles are being replenished, and long-overdue capabilities are re-emerging as political priorities. The European Union’s sense of urgency is no longer conceptual. It is active, accelerating, and broadly welcomed.
But urgency alone does not create power. Behind this momentum lies a quieter concern.
Within defence ministries, EU institutions, and industrial circles, it is increasingly recognised that rearmament is outpacing Europe’s capacity to steer it strategically.
Ammunition shortages persist. Major system deliveries are routinely delayed. The European Defence Industrial Strategy, presented in March 2025, set forth an ambitious agenda to consolidate efforts and accelerate production.
Its centrepiece, the ReArm Europe plan, outlines over €800bn in defence investment over the next decade. Yet the gap between vision and delivery remains wide.
The problem is not a lack of political will. It is structural.
National preferences continue to outweigh collective logic. Europe’s armed forces remain fragmented, with redundant platforms, divergent operational doctrines, and limited interoperability. The result is a lack of critical mass, sluggish force generation, and vulnerable logistics chains. Institutions are better aligned than in the past, but alignment does not equal integration. Policy frameworks are multiplying; military cohesion remains elusive.
France and Germany remain the indispensable pillars of the European defence project. Each contributes distinct, vital strengths. France is the Union’s only nuclear power, with a global diplomatic presence, strategic autonomy in operations, and world-class intelligence capabilities. Its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and combat-tested forces provide a credibility that no treaty can replicate. President Macron’s recent meeting with Donald Trump served as a reminder of France’s singular ability to operate confidently across both European and transatlantic spheres.
Germany brings industrial and fiscal scale. The Zeitenwende [era change] initiative marked a historic shift in Berlin’s defence posture, committing €100bn to modernisation. German firms such as Rheinmetall and Hensoldt are now central to Europe’s rearmament effort.
Yet many inside planning circles quietly question whether Germany’s financial surge is being matched by a coherent military vision. The strength of the Franco-German axis will determine whether European defence becomes a shared strategic reality or remains a patchwork of national ambitions.
Equally significant is the United Kingdom, which remains a crucial strategic reservoir for European security.
Despite Brexit, Britain's advanced military capabilities, global intelligence networks, and expeditionary experience continue to underpin Europe’s collective defence. The UK’s leadership within Nato, particularly in high-readiness forces, cyber warfare, intelligence sharing (notably via the Five Eyes alliance), and nuclear deterrence, remains irreplaceable.
Maintaining close alignment with the UK is not just beneficial. It is strategically essential. As Europe accelerates its rearmament, practical and political cooperation with Britain will significantly enhance overall readiness and resilience.
What remains missing is assertive political leadership at the European level.
Brussels has made notable progress. The European Commission, the EU foreign affairs chief, and the European Defence Agency have brought defence firmly into the mainstream of EU policy. Their efforts to develop funding tools, support industrial coordination, and foster a shared strategic culture deserve recognition.
The Defence Industrial Strategy and the ReArm plan are important achievements. But institutions alone cannot drive transformative change. Clear priorities must be defined. Procurement must be streamlined. Fragmentation must be corrected, not tolerated. Strategic convergence cannot rely solely on member states’ goodwill.
This was the underlying theme at recent high-level meetings. At the informal gathering of EU defence ministers in Warsaw on 2–3 April 2025, ministers reaffirmed the need for readiness and resilience. They acknowledged that Europe must prepare for high-intensity scenarios, not theoretical ones.
Ukraine’s defence minister, Rustem Umerov, joined remotely to underscore the continued urgency of support. Nato deputy secretary general Radmila Shekerinska reminded participants that Europe’s credibility now depends on sustained commitment, not declarations.
Dual-use sectors and critical technologies are increasingly exposed to foreign capital with limited oversight
Just days earlier, Nato foreign ministers convened in Brussels to prepare for the July 2025 summit in The Hague.
The message from allies was clear. European nations must assume greater responsibility within the Alliance. Not merely to meet spending targets, but to ensure that capabilities genuinely match ambitions.
Simultaneously, Europe must address vulnerabilities within its own defence ecosystem. Dual-use sectors and critical technologies are increasingly exposed to foreign capital with limited oversight.
Sovereignty today is not only about who commands forces, but also about who owns the means to build and sustain them. Financial openness must be balanced with strategic responsibility.
Trusted partnerships remain essential. Israel’s battlefield innovation, particularly in missile defence, counter-drone systems, and rapid tactical adaptation, continues to shape European procurement and doctrine. This cooperation is not a political gesture, but a recognition of operational value grounded in shared strategic logic.
Meanwhile, president Donald Trump’s recent tariffs on EU imports serve as a reminder of shifting geopolitical winds. The US remains Europe’s indispensable ally, and Nato its most credible defence framework. Yet no external relationship, however robust, can replace internal resilience. Strategic autonomy cannot be rhetorical. It must be grounded in capability, coherence, and control.
Europe’s rearmament is not only justified. It is overdue. But without strategic leadership to define common goals, coordinate procurement, and enforce discipline, Europe risks fragmentation rather than unity. In today's volatile environment, where threats evolve faster than institutions respond, time is no longer a neutral variable. It is the decisive one.
António Brás Monteiro is a Portuguese specialist in EU and Nato affairs, serving as a defence expert at the European Commission and as a member of the Nato Industrial Advisory Group. He holds board positions in various security and defence associations and companies, and has published articles in Forbes Portugal, Diário de Notícias, European Security & Defence, Segurança & Defesa, among others.
António Brás Monteiro is a Portuguese specialist in EU and Nato affairs, serving as a defence expert at the European Commission and as a member of the Nato Industrial Advisory Group. He holds board positions in various security and defence associations and companies, and has published articles in Forbes Portugal, Diário de Notícias, European Security & Defence, Segurança & Defesa, among others.