As a journalist who has spent years covering the intricacies of EU cohesion funds, it is disheartening to witness how often this policy is reduced to sensational headlines.
In the last few days, the media has fixated on the prospect of cohesion funds being used for defence spending, sparking alarm without sufficient context or understanding of how those funds actually work and the likelihood of seeing a third of the EU budget financing the European defence industry.
While such discussions merit scrutiny, they diverge us from the core of the matter.
Their true purpose is to tackle some of the most urgent challenges facing Europe today — from demographic decline to climate change. Yet, their impact has been debated and this should worry us all, for real.
It is paradoxical that, while the future of cohesion funds is thrust into the media spotlight, little attention has been paid to how this third of the EU budget has been spent over the past decades.
For years, cohesion policy has largely been treated as a technical and bureaucratic matter. When it made to the news, it is often through two main narratives: rare but damaging cases of corruption or delays in spending, particularly in less-developed regions.
While journalists should report on these instances, they represent a tiny fraction of the overall spending.
The delays in fund allocation are usually rooted in more complex structural challenges, such as under-resourced or unskilled public administrations and overly complex procedures.
These issues, which deserve far more attention, are linked to the capability of public servants to identify and implement impactful investments for regional GDP growth — a topic recently highlighted by commissioner Elisa Ferreira’s reflection on the future of cohesion policy, a process that has been largely overlooked by the media.
Things shifted after 2020 when cohesion funds began to be used outside their original scope. During the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, for instance, the commission authorised the allocation of remaining funds from the 2014-2020 programming period to provide emergency support.
Similarly, these funds were used to assist regions bordering Ukraine with the influx of refugees.
These exceptional reallocations were justified by urgent needs in high-pressure regions. But they turned to be a good opportunity for commissioner Ferreira to bring renewed media attention to the existence of these funds as they became the first tool available for crisis management.
However, when these initiatives were launched, us journalists and field experts struggled to understand the actual amount of resources available and the processes to access them, as most of the 2014-2020 funds had already been allocated.
While journalists should report on delays and corruption, they represent a tiny fraction of the overall spending
Before discussing the potential use of 2021-2027 cohesion funds for defence — and without succumbing to panic — we must first understand how these resources work.
Every seven years, the EU sets its budget for cohesion policy and priorities, with the current programming period running from 2021 to 2027.
Due to delays caused by the pandemic, these funds have only recently begun to flow. Before any funds are spent, member states must sign a Partnership Agreement with the European Commission outlining their strategic priorities.
Once plans are finalised, the funds are “decided” but not immediately spent. As of today, only about three to five percent of allocated funds have been utilised.
This is not a cause for concern; it reflects the necessary time for planning and execution.
If we continue to sensationalise cohesion funds and ignore their role in addressing critical regional disparities, we risk politicising them to the point of jeopardising their future. This could further fracture EU unity, allowing populist narratives to thrive at the expense of long-term collective investments
Critical decisions regarding the funds’ direction have already been made, and as shown by data, about 27 percent of the funds have been “decided.” Thus, the low spending rate at this stage should not be seen as an indication of failure or inefficiency. Nor does it mean they can be “redirected” to finance defense, as this is not currently an eligible objective for cohesion funds.
What is true, and should alarm us, is that cohesion policy is under scrutiny because many European regions are caught in a development trap.
While cohesion policy has significantly impacted the GDP of poorer regions, particularly in eastern Europe, it has struggled to foster growth in lagging areas such as southern Italy and Spain.
This may prompt policymakers to reconsider the funding method, potentially opting for a more centralized approach similar to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) model, rather than the place-based development strategy currently in use. This could potentially mean to re-direct funding where it is easier to see a return of investment, the already competitive regions, fuelling the geography of discontent.
At this point, we must ask: what does the future hold for these funds if journalists and policymakers fail to grasp their true purpose and potential?
If we continue to sensationalise cohesion funds and ignore their role in addressing critical regional disparities, we risk politicising them to the point of jeopardising their future. This could further fracture EU unity, allowing populist narratives to thrive at the expense of long-term collective investments.
The rise of 'frugality' within the EU — a form of economic populism advocating austerity and budget cuts — has already put cohesion funds at risk in the past. Too often, these funds are discussed as a luxury or waste, without considering their broader social and economic impacts on Europe’s future.
The recent alarm over the potential use of these funds for defence spending reflects this misguided focus. In reality, the most likely scenario is that regions hosting defence industries might receive support to help transition, but this should not distract from the more significant conversations about how these funds drive sustainable development and address Europe’s urgent challenges. We must understand why some strategies succeed while others fail to hold EU, national, and local policymakers accountable.
As a final note: I completely understand the challenge of maintaining our independence while ensuring that our coverage of stories related to projects funded by cohesion policy does not become an echo of the European Commission. I’ve been there.
However, sensationalist headlines cannot be the solution. We need to move beyond that and make a conscious effort not to patronise our readers. They are capable of grasping the nuanced information necessary to understand the true stakes.
Let’s move past alarmism and commit to informed, responsible reporting that respects our audience’s intelligence. Such reporting holds both leaders and the media accountable for the future we are collectively shaping.