The EU's unwavering support for Rwanda must end now

On 26 January, the M23 rebellion, supported by the Rwandan army, took over the eastern DR Congo city of Goma. This marked a major escalation of the Congolese conflict.

The M23 rebellion had (re)started its activities in November 2021; and particularly over the last two years dramatically expanded its territory over eastern Congo.

This had stark humanitarian consequences: in the first half of 2024 alone, the group caused over two million people to be displaced. It quickly became clear that M23 was supported by Rwanda: a string of UN reports have proven the direct military support from the Rwandan army for M23: a conservative estimate of last year did put the presence of Rwandan troops at between 3,000 and 4,000.

Currently, the rebellion is on its way to Bukavu, another major city in eastern DRC – in what could be a prelude to a de facto annexation by Rwanda and M23.

When, in 2012-2013, the M23 took Goma for the first time, the firm international reaction was crucial in ending the conflict. The major donor countries, including the EU and several member states, cut down a significant amount of development aid to the country.

Currently, the reality is quite different: while a range of strong political statements have been made – including from the EU and a number of member states – this has not materialised into concrete actions.

Germany, UK, and EU silence

The only strong reactions so far have come from Belgium (which pushed for the suspension of the EU's minerals deal with Rwanda), Germany (which suspended aid-related exchanges) and the United Kingdom, which has threatened to suspend its bilateral aid to Rwanda. Other countries remain silent.

At this point, it’s key for the EU to take decisive action: not doing so risks leading to a conflict further spinning out of control, plunging the region into conflict. 

Over the past few years, the EU has taken a number of particularly problematic decisions with regard to DR Congo and Rwanda. These have seriously affected its legitimacy in the region — and particularly DR Congo. 

In 2022 and 2024, the EU, through the European Peace Facility (EPF), has twice provided the Rwandan army with €20m to support its peacekeeping operations in  Mozambique. This happened despite strong criticisms on the actual use of this aid, with concerns that it would be used to wage war in DR Congo, rather than for its peacekeeping troops in Mozambique.

At the end of 2023, the European Union also announced an investment of €900m in Rwanda through its Global Gateway programme. As these agreements were concluded while Rwanda’s support for M23 had been widely shown, they triggered widespread protests in Congo. 

During the same period — in February 2024 — a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the European Union and Rwanda for a strategic partnership in the field of critical minerals.

This was enough for the agreement to be interpreted by many as explicit support for the looting of Congolese minerals — and more specifically coltan, needed for high-tech applications —  by Rwanda and the European Union. Moreover, three months after the signature of this MoU, the M23 took the Rubaya mine, which, according to some estimates, would produce nearly 20 percent of the world’s coltan.

Why did the European Union or its member states sign these agreements while a war supported by Rwanda was raging?

Nurturing the ambition to become the 'Singapore of Africa', Rwanda has always managed to gain the support from key members of the international community.

It succeeded in achieving impressive developmental results, such as in healthcare. Additionally, the Rwandan army provides a significant portion of peacekeeping troops on the African continent, such as for securing Cabo Delgado in Mozambique.

These factors, still coupled with the ongoing guilt-complex for its failure during the 1994 genocide, have led EU member states and high-ranking European officials to offer unwavering support to Rwanda.

This explains why the aforementioned agreements were signed: a combination of the popularity of the Rwandan development model with the pursuit of national and European Union interests.

France was the driving force behind the €40m granted to the Rwandan army in Mozambique: it was aimed at protecting the French company TotalEnergies, which had been forced to halt a €20bn gas project in Cabo Delgado due to insecurity created by Islamist movements.

France

One might have hoped that the capture of Goma would be the shock that would push the European Union to change course. However, despite certain member states efforts to sanction Rwanda, they were once again blocked by France: national interests prevailed.

Europe seems to remain blind to one of the most significant current violations of international law, highlighting its obvious double standards compared with the situation in Ukraine.

Indifference prevails when it comes to the longstanding conflict in eastern DRC, which has been continuing for decades.

The current situation could easily lead to a de facto modification of the DRC-Rwandan border, a ‘Crimea-like’ situation, opening up a Pandora’s box of irredentism all over the continent.

The grave mistakes made by the Congolese presidency are not an excuse to condone or encourage Rwanda's military operations.

The above EU agreements have directly harmed the EU’s legitimacy in central Africa. 

A first and important step in restoring this legitimacy — and especially to contribute to ending the war — would be a very clear EU stance towards Rwanda, and particularly with regards to the recently concluded agreements: each of these included conditionalities which in the current context have not been met, and therefore should be ended.

No action will also further harm Europe’s authority: it is not far-fetched to imagine how, as in west Africa, we may soon end up with rabidly anti-Western governments.