The 100,000 pages of Ukraine EU accession problems

If Ukraine is to join the EU it will be required, as part of its accession criteria, to implement around 100,000 pages of the bloc’s rulebook.

Implementing these rules could come at the cost of longer term social, economic and political consequences — both for Ukraine and the bloc’s existing member states.

Depending on how these consequences are managed, the implementation of these rules could strengthen democracy, and provide considerable economic benefits to both sides, or they could undermine the chances of economic stability in Ukraine.

If the EU does not deal in time with its longer-term consequences, the process of rule transfer will potentially diminish the chances of sustained support for EU membership and provide ample room for Russian strategies to manipulate political developments in Kyiv, undermining whatever gains Ukraine could achieve on the military front and with it the chances of lasting peace in Europe.

In the history of EU enlargements, the most recent wave stands out due to the close link between the success of integration and long-term EU security considerations.

If Ukraine’s integration results in economic instability or a weakened democracy, it would represent a significant setback for Europe and a direct threat to its security. Equally important, failure to address the potential negative economic consequences of Ukraine’s integration in a timely manner may delay or block Ukraine’s membership altogether, weakening EU security and diminishing its global influence.

 The incoming EU Commission must revisit the enlargement strategy using the lessons of the previous “Big Bang” approach. It was this that yielded the spread of eurosceptic illiberalism and the emergence of regimes led by the likes of Viktor Orban and Jarosław Kaczyński.

Industrial upgrade or de-industrialisation?

Depending on how the implementation of EU economic rules is done, enlargement can yield industrial upgrading or de-industrialisation. It can improve the competitive position of Ukrainian firms or territorial units in the single market or lead to their marginalisation.

The most important lesson from the previous wave of Eastern enlargement is that the way the implementation of economic chapters is governed during accession shapes the potential for nationalist, illiberal forces to emerge five to eight years after accession

Rule-compliance might help the emergence of a solid middle class or result in the growth of an exploited working poor.

Integration could increase domestic capacity and the space for Ukrainian actors to guide the direction of economic change, or it might increase their dependence on the strategic decisions of international private and public actors.

Five years later?

The most important lesson from the previous wave of Eastern enlargement is that the way the implementation of economic chapters is governed during accession shapes the potential for nationalist, illiberal forces to emerge five to eight years after accession. 

This was a point that was emphasised, repeatedly, during a meeting of experts and lawmakers at the 2024 Budapest Forum.

During the accession process closeness to Europe is the narrative that most appeals to the electorate.  However, if mishandled, the day after successful accession no party can win an election without promising to wrestle power back from Brussels.

Remediating the perceived unfair treatment by the EU becomes a powerful tool for political entrepreneurs who justify their assaults on civil rights in the name of national sovereignty.

The EU Commission of the 1990s and early 2000s experimented with managing some of the longer term consequences of integration.

It mandated accession countries to incorporate planning in the process of implementing EU rules, anticipating some of the major negative consequences of compliance.

It helped mobilise resources to manage some of the major potential challenges. Occasionally it even protected nascent industries for limited periods, and supported restructuring programmes. It also mobilised a transnational network involving several units of the commission, international financial institutions, development banks, and ministries in both member and accession states.

While these steps helped to keep afloat the economies of the 10 new member states, their longer term effects were limited because they were motivated by just one objective: decreasing the potential costs of enlargement for the other member states.

Much more is needed in Ukraine to create a broad-based coalition of support for the democratic institutions that have the capacity to deliver meaningful results for ordinary people.

The challenges are considerable, as is the prize to be earned.

In the case of Ukraine, the challenges of post-war reconstruction combine with the need for industrial advancement in a country that is struggling with a sustained deindustrialisation and growing accumulation of debt. The valuable prize is the EU and Ukraine jointly winning the peace. 

One approach might be to closely couple post-war reconstruction and rule transfer.  In this way, the detection of potential negative impacts takes place alongside exploration of opportunities for ambitious industrial and regional economic renewal projects.

Effectively managing the longer term consequences of rule transfer could allow the Ukrainian state to serve its debts to the external funders and the Ukrainian people while promoting economic development. Sharing the governance of these processes between the EU and Ukraine might help build the developmental capacities of the Ukrainian state, as well as improving the accountability of the involved parts of EU administration.

The Ukraine Facility, the EU’s €50bn support mechanism launched in March 2024, could be a step in the right direction.

It will need to focus on upgrading the capacities of diverse state and non-state actors in Ukraine to align with EU rules while maximising developmental benefits.

Finally, Ukraine should be included in emerging EU-wide industrial policies in ways that increase mutual gains for both Ukraine and current EU members.

This would significantly improve its chances of smoothly securing the votes needed to become a member of the European Union when the time comes.