European nations continue to struggle with irregular migration along land and sea routes. Despite reforms such as the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, the debate on migration remains contentious and central in political campaigns.
Extreme policies aimed at curbing migration are becoming more prevalent, and the EU’s agreements with transit countries often lack adequate human rights protections.
At the same time, persistent drivers of migration, combined with a demand for irregular migrant labour in destination countries, push many to embark on dangerous journeys, benefiting smugglers.
The call for "safe and legal routes" has emerged as a key demand from progressive voices. Yet, while this approach has been included in various global and regional agreements, there has been little progress in turning it into a viable solution, and this somewhat simplistic call fails to seriously address some of the complexities of creating such routes.
In 2023, the US introduced the concept of 'Safe Mobility Offices' (SMOs) as a way to address irregular migration, with the aim of offering refugees and vulnerable migrants legal pathways and protection from smugglers.
Given the much larger migration challenge faced by the US at its southern border compared to Europe, could this model work in the European context?
The SMOs, established in Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, offer access to refugee resettlement and provide information on legal migration pathways, including humanitarian parole, family reunification, and labour migration. While primarily targeting a limited number of eligible nationalities, these offices have also facilitated migration to countries like Canada and Spain.
A study by the Mixed Migration Centre examined whether this model could be adapted to the context of mixed migration towards Europe.
The conclusion: yes, SMOs could be a promising approach for Europe, but only with significant adjustments. The concept of SMOs demonstrates that with sufficient resources and political will, resettlement and migration pathways can be made accessible.
However, several key lessons must be learned from the American example if the model is to work for Europe.
First, the SMOs show that a well-resourced system can support expedited and accessible refugee resettlement. The US effort highlights the potential for responsibility-sharing in the global context of forced migration. A similar system in Europe, could offer an important complement to the existing asylum system.
Second, the limitations of SMOs in the Americas highlight challenges that would need to be addressed in Europe. Most notably, the eligibility criteria have been restrictive, meaning many of the migrants most in need of assistance, and most likely to be in transit, engage in dangerous onward movement and rely on smugglers, are excluded. Moreover, the SMOs primarily facilitate refugee resettlement and do not adequately provide access to other forms of legal migration. A European SMO model would need to expand its scope to include more accessible pathways, especially for labour migration, which could help reduce the reliance on smugglers and the risks associated with irregular journeys. With the high demand for migrant labour across Europe’s ageing societies this could be feasible.
Third, the SMO initiative requires careful collaboration between various stakeholders, including governments and international organizations like UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM). In Europe, such cooperation would also be crucial, but would likely be more challenging, given the often transactional nature of the EU’s relationships with transit countries. Europe’s past migration deals have focused more on paying countries to prevent migration than on forming genuine partnerships. Establishing a European SMO system would require a shift towards a more equitable approach, potentially building on frameworks like the Joint Valetta Action Plan.
Fourth, civil society should play an important role in a future European SMO initiative, both in raising awareness and holding governments accountable. In the American SMO model, civil society engagement has been limited, leaving many frustrated by a lack of inclusion.
Fifth, safeguarding access to asylum is fundamental. SMOs should not be seen as a replacement for domestic asylum systems. While they can offer safe migration options, they must not serve as a cover for restricting access to asylum cat Europe’s borders.
Finally, any European adaptation of the SMO model would need to use technology wisely to ensure inclusivity. The American SMOs allow for self-referral through online systems, which reduces the need for gatekeepers. However, this reliance on technology risks excluding the most vulnerable migrants who lack access to the internet or do not speak the required languages.
In conclusion, while the SMO model offers a promising approach to managing irregular migration, its replication in Europe would require significant modifications. It would need political will, a broader scope of migration pathways beyond resettlement, and a commitment to maintaining access to asylum. If these challenges can be addressed, the SMO model could help provide orderly migration options for those in need, while reducing dangerous irregular journeys and the reliance on smugglers.
However, it should not be seen as a silver bullet; it must be accompanied by other measures such as faster asylum processing, fair distribution of refugees among European countries, and a better-functioning return system.
Bram Frouws is the director of the Mixed Migration Centre, an NGO providing independent data, research, analysis & expertise on migration.
Bram Frouws is the director of the Mixed Migration Centre, an NGO providing independent data, research, analysis & expertise on migration.