Hungary’s democratic Rubik’s Cube

It is perhaps fitting that Hungary has chosen the Rubik’s Cube as the logo for its upcoming EU presidency.

It may signal “the essence of Hungarian genius” – as Hungarian EU affairs minister János Bóka claims - but it also represents a complicated dynamic where each piece of the puzzle is interconnected and solving one part creates problems elsewhere.

This is how Viktor Orbán’s government has been able to tighten its grip on state institutions and take control of the media; through a centralised internal mechanism able to impose an ever-evolving set of laws and precedents designed to intimidate, deter and silence opponents at home while obfuscating critics abroad.

Take Hungary’s new Sovereignty Law. Unlike similar legislation recently introduced in Georgia that drew condemnation from the international community and a stinging rebuke from Brussels, it failed to provoke a similar outcry but has nevertheless deeply impacted civil society in the run-up to the recent European Parliament elections and a further targeted crackdown this week.

The Protection of National Sovereignty Act established a new Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) and amended the Hungarian Criminal Code, prescribing a prison sentence for organisations and individuals using foreign funding – overtly or “in disguise to circumvent the prohibition” - for political campaign purposes. 

Fiercely opposed by civil society organisations, citizens and independent media outlets inside Hungary, the law has drawn criticism from the Council of Europe commissioner for human rights, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of expression and the special rapporteur on human rights defenders, and the Venice Commission.

But this has not stopped it from having a chilling effect on the exercise of a wide range of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, and right to access to information, which has led to a distortion of public discourse and democratic life.

The Sovereignty Law has had the greatest impact on organisations working directly on or around elections. It has enforced a culture of fear within civil society and the media, diverted already limited resources and attention, stifled cooperation and imposed a level of self-censorship.

This matters because the country already falls well short of the requirements for free and transparent elections that should be standard within the EU – as Hungary’s most prominent Hungarian election-related organisations including 20k, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Monitor, Political Capital and Unhack Democracy have already concluded .

The joint report into the EU parliament and local elections found the dominance of the ruling party in public advertising, media, and social media was striking.

From the beginning of 2024 until election day, Fidesz and two government-organised nongovernmental organisations ([GO]NGOs), Megafon and Civil Solidarity Forum (CÖF), spent fours times as much on Facebook and Google (HUF 2.1bn / €5.3m) compared with opposition parties and their associated media combined.

In connection with the local elections, the involvement of local public authorities in the campaign and the use of municipal resources for campaign purposes were widespread. This came on top of gerrymandering that occurred with the redrawing of electoral maps in late 2023, in multiple cases raising suspicions of illegality or political motivation.

On election day itself, polling station commission members surveyed by Unhack Democracy reported the organised transport of voters, 'electoral tourism' and vote buying. The National Election Office has announced mayoral elections in six municipalities will be re-run due to law violations and the Supreme Court has ruled a new election needs to be held in one precinct because of vote buying. Abuses, in particular, voter interference during mobile voting in nursing homes and at polling stations among young people, remain systemic.

This mirrors a pattern of voting irregularities observed across multiple elections dating back to the 2018 parliamentary vote, when Unhack Democracy put Viktor Orbán’s super-majority into question.

The failings of Hungarian democracy have been well documented, but require reexamination at a time when its diplomats look to shape the EU’s agenda to - as the tagline for its rotating presidency claims - “Make Europe Great Again”. 

The EU must do more to counter democratic rollback within its borders. It can improve the accountability and transparency of elections by mandating citizen observation, which is currently not allowed in Hungary as well as other member states. It can also improve the effectiveness of pro-democracy civil society by adopting a “common market” for non-profit associations.

As MEP Sergey Lagodinsky said in March, democracy does not end at country borders. This new directive will significantly improve access and funding for nonprofits operating cross-border and go some way to countering draconian domestic “foreign agent” legislation increasingly seen across Europe.

The impact of the Sovereignty Law - and the collective experience of civil society organisations working on recent elections - demonstrates the importance of fostering a supportive civic ecosystem in Hungary and across the region, properly supported with long-term sustainable funding, and not afraid to take risks to defend the democratic process.

There is no single solution or magic bullet to countering democratic rollback. Like a Rubik’s Cube, the solution lies in seeing each moving piece as part of an interconnected puzzle. Only then will all the sides align.