Following the latest coalition agreements between the radical-right and the centre-right in the Netherlands and Croatia, seven EU member states are now governed or supported by the radical right.
More could come about, with elections looming in Belgium, Bulgaria and for the European Parliament.
The old cordon sanitaire policy of keeping the radical-right out of power has not succeeded in preventing its rise. Now that some politicians are open to new alliances at the far-right end of the political spectrum, the question is: what is the price of normalizing the radical-right?
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has been trying to divide the radical right by courting some actors, most notably Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, and isolating others, such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán.
The logic behind the tactic is clear. Dividing the two far-right political groupings in the European Parliament – the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the Identity and Democracy (ID) group is critical to ensure a coherent agenda for the next commission.
These parties are already divided on supporting Ukraine and sanctioning Russia, two key priorities for EU diplomats. Similar dividing lines can be found on issues such as Nato and the US, as a recent Carnegie Europe report on Europe’s radical right and foreign policy shows.
Secondly, the next commission that von der Leyen wants to lead will also require a plurality of votes beyond the four main parties on the left and right of the political centre. Unable to satisfy everyone, her tactic is to pick those parties that are most likely to align with her priorities.
Thirdly, the European People’s Party to which von der Leyen belongs has long been flirting with the radical right, either by embracing some issues on its agenda or by explicitly toying with forming an alliance with some of its members.
After all, Orbán’s Fidesz’s party was a member of the EPP until Hungary’s abandonment of liberal democratic principles became a source of tension within the group. There can be points of contact between the family values of Europe’s centre-right and the ultra-conservative values of those further to the right.
Finally, working with the radical-right can take some wind out of their wings. The Finnish centre-radical right coalition government is based on a carefully negotiated agreement that aims to prevent discontinuity in Finland’s Europe policies.
Italy’s Forza Italia has moved closer to the centre under the leadership of Antonio Tajani. However, whereas populist parties with loose ideologies adapt, the radical-right can fall back on its ideological and electoral core if electorally penalised for cozying up with the centre.
This normalisation has a price tag. Migration policy provides the best example. In a bid to fend off the rise of the radical-right, the EU has supported migration deals with Turkey in 2016 and, more recently, with Tunisia, Egypt, and others, notwithstanding the human rights conditions in these countries. Von der Leyen has personally supported Italy’s public diplomacy around these agreements, giving credence to Meloni’s argument that, thanks to her interventions, Italy is having a greater say in the direction of Europe.
Yet the deals did nothing to prevent the rise of the more extreme right. Rather, it paved the way for an ethically questionable tougher migration policy by tightening border controls, increasing returns of unwanted migrants, and paying third countries to prevent migration flows to Europe, culminating in the Migration Pact that was recently approved
It has also seen Meloni, herself, become something of a conduit for the ambitions of the EU’s far-right political grouping. Meloni’s apparent success in getting the attention of the commission has prompted Marine Le Pen, leader of the radical-right National Rally, to distance her party from the Alternative for Germany and seek new alliances.
The normalization pattern is well known, as political scientists such as Cas Mudde and Jan Werner-Muller have long evidenced: the centre-right gets its hands dirty in trying to respond to demands coming from the right, without the ballot box gains. The next policy area that is seeing this pattern unfold is climate policy.
The EU’s migration policy has damaged Europe’s standing in the world. Still, policies can potentially be reversed. But if democratic institutions and processes are tampered with, the costs of working with the radical right rises further. The EU has tools to halt attacks on the rule of law in its member states, but it was slow in activating them in the case of Hungary in the 2010s, when Orbán started dismantling the rule of law in pursuit of what he calls ‘illiberal democracy’. Arguably, Orbán’s membership of the EPP was one factor that inhibited an early, muscular response to prevent Hungary’s democratic backsliding and the consolidation of a systematic spoiler within the EU.
The growing number of governing experiments with radical-right parties could put democratic institutions at risk. Italy’s government has proposed constitutional changes that would strengthen executive powers at the expense of the Parliament. The changes would also weaken the oversight of the President of the Republic, who is the custodian of the Italian Constitution, and, according to legal experts, could limit the electorate’s ability to censure government power.
One has to ask whether the EU institutions will be inclined to monitor the standards of European democracy if they depend on the political support of part of the radical-right. Turning a blind eye to the erosion of democratic standards may have short term gains but longer-term costs.
Rosa Balfour is director of Carnegie Europe and the co-author of a major new report Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy.
Rosa Balfour is director of Carnegie Europe and the co-author of a major new report Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy.