The EU is negotiating the details of its strategic partnership with Rwanda at a time when Rwandan troops have invaded the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
A UN group of experts report from July conservatively estimated that 3,000-4,000 Rwandan troops are stationed in DRC’s North Kivu. Using heavy weaponry, they have been fighting alongside the M23 rebel group and were instrumental in vastly expanding their territorial control by encircling the provincial capital Goma in April 2024.
Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame has appeared to question the border between Rwanda and DRC — which many Congolese have interpreted as an annexation threat.
Both sides have frequently employed heavy artillery within or near densely populated areas causing heavy civilian casualties. The Rwandan-backed M23 militia has been involved in severe human rights abuses such as abducting, imprisoning, torturing and executing civilians, as well as recruiting children, some of which may constitute war crimes according to the UN experts.
The EU Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen in February called on Rwanda to “immediately withdraw its troops from DRC, cease all support to M23”, but unless the EU accompanies the statement with strong measures, demands like these fall flat. Western donors fund almost a third of Rwanda’s budget and European countries are some of Rwanda’s major donors and therefore have considerable clout.
The “sustainable and responsible production and valorisation of critical and strategic raw materials” is listed as one of five areas of cooperation by the EU in its agreements with Rwanda. It’s hard to imagine a scenario further away from that description, than Rwanda’s military involvement in DRC and its minerals sector.
The Rwandan-backed M23 has established full control over coltan production in the Rubaya area that is estimated to supply 15 percent of the world’s tantalum demand, the metal into which coltan is processed.
The rebel group generates some $300,000 [€277,000] a month, the head of the DRC stabilisation mission declared recently. For several months, the M23 also controlled all trading routes for minerals from the area which is within a close distance of Rwanda’s border.
UN experts note that Rwanda’s coltan exports have increased by 50 percent in 2023 compared to 2022. This means Rwanda has become the world’s largest coltan exporter in 2023 despite its own limited deposits.
The historical context underscores the gravity of the situation.
During the Second Congo War (1998-2003), the Rwandan military and its proxies plundered vast quantities of 3T minerals (tin, tantalum, and tungsten ores) from DRC. Ever since, Rwanda has continued to profit from taxing smuggled 3T minerals, which have fuelled conflict.
Rwanda's involvement in the illicit gold trade is also well-documented.
Despite its own negligible production, gold has become Rwanda’s major export product, making up 47 percent of exports in 2020 after an extraordinary 755 percent increase in 2019. Experts believe that most of this gold is smuggled from DRC, further entrenching Rwanda's role in the conflict minerals trade.
The EU Commission proposes “traceability … at the core of the EU-Rwanda critical raw materials partnership” supposedly as a countermeasure to the huge risk of sourcing conflict minerals.
But Global Witness has shown that ITSCI, the dominant traceability system for 3T minerals in Rwanda has laundered huge volumes of smuggled conflict minerals since its set up. The EU risks further fuelling violence in DRC with its raw materials deal with Rwanda.
One reason why the EU has not been willing to take decisive action may be Rwanda’s growing geopolitical role for the EU’s procurement of raw materials from Africa.
Rwanda’s military is supporting Mozambique to fight an Islamist insurgency which has threatened access to natural resources extracted by Western companies. In 2022 the EU paid €20m to support the Rwandan troops in Mozambique and currently considers adding double the amount.
Analysts have noted the role of Rwandan troops in protecting a French-owned gas facility and more recently also Western minerals projects.
Apart from such bilateral agreements, Rwanda is also the largest African contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions while, ironically, simultaneously targeting staff assets and operations of the UN peacekeeping mission in eastern DRC.
Rwanda often threatens the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces to evade sanctions, according to Rwanda’s former ambassador to the UN.
So far, the EU has only sanctioned two individuals of the Rwandan Defence Force involved in the invasion of eastern DRC.
Speaking anonymously to Politico, an EU official said that the EU wants to use its raw materials partnership with Rwanda “to leverage change on the ground” by requesting that Rwanda map its mines and participate in the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative, which promotes the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources. These are important conditions for a potential EU strategic partnership with Rwanda, but only once Rwanda has fully withdrawn its troops and stopped financing M23.
The EU must urgently use its leverage to pressure Rwanda to withdraw its troops from DRC and stop funding the M23 rebel group.
That means that the EU should freeze its official development assistance to Rwanda and consider further sanctions against commanders of armed groups and senior officials responsible or complicit in abuses.
The EU should suspend its negotiations of a raw materials partnership with Rwanda. Once Rwanda has withdrawn its troops, the EU should assess whether a raw materials partnership with Rwanda can be reconciled with its sustainability principles. If the EU pursues the partnership, it should set conditions that bring transparency into Rwanda’s mining sector and make details of the partnership public.
Alex Kopp is senior campaigner at Global Witness, an NGO challenging corporate power.
Alex Kopp is senior campaigner at Global Witness, an NGO challenging corporate power.