Greenland has suddenly become a test case for Europe’s capacity to defend its own territory.
The issue is not theoretical. Repeated statements from senior figures in Washington, including Donald Trump, questioning Greenland’s status have transformed it into an open strategic problem.
Europe cannot afford any ambiguity here. What is at stake is not only the sovereignty of Denmark, but the credibility of the European Union as a security actor.
The most immediate and visible step would be the urgent establishment of a limited European military presence in Greenland, at Denmark’s request, as suggested by France already early in 2025.
This would not be a force designed to fight the United States, nor a step towards militarising the Arctic. Its purpose would be deterrence.
A multinational European contingent, rotating and modest in size, would serve three functions. First, it would internationalise the security of Greenland.
Any hostile act would no longer be a bilateral issue between Copenhagen and Washington, but an incident involving several European states.
Second, it would increase the political and strategic cost of any attempt at coercion or fait accompli.
Third, it would demonstrate that Europe is willing to defend its member states not only rhetorically, but in deeds. Effective deterrence does not require parity of force. It requires clarity, visibility and political commitment.
A European presence in Greenland would deliver all three.
Deterrence must also be legal and explicit.
Denmark should formally notify its EU partners that, in the event of an armed aggression against Greenland, it will request the activation of Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union on mutual assistance in the event of aggression.
This provision creates a binding obligation of aid and assistance between member states. It applies to the territory of a member state.
Greenland’s status as an overseas territory does not weaken Denmark’s rights under the clause.
Advance notification would serve an essential purpose: it would remove uncertainty and strengthen deterrence. It would make clear that an attack on Greenland would automatically trigger a European response.
This is precisely how deterrence works: by eliminating ambiguity before a crisis occurs.
Security measures alone are not enough. Greenland’s long-term protection also requires anchoring it more firmly within the European legal and political framework.
Greenland left the European Communities in 1985 and is an 'Overseas Country and Territory'. This status places it outside the EU’s constitutional space. In the current geopolitical environment, that distance has become a vulnerability.
Greenland should therefore request a change of status and seek to become a 'Region Outermost of the European Union'.
This would not be a symbolic gesture.
It would mean the application of EU law, access to EU policies, and full inclusion in the Union’s legal order, with the necessary adaptations foreseen by the treaties for outermost regions.
Such a move would require political consent in Greenland and a revision of the treaties. But it would send a powerful signal: Greenland would no longer be a grey zone at the edge of Europe, but an integral part of it.
At the same time, Denmark, which is in charge of Greenland´s foreign and security policy, and that is likely to need a strong show of European solidarity, should complete its own European integration.
"The country has remained far too long in the periphery of the European Union, maintaining a permanent opt-out from the euro, staying outside large parts of Justice and Home Affairs, and — until very recently — excluding itself from the Union’s common defence policy.
Two issues remain.
First, Denmark should commit to joining the euro.
In a moment of strategic pressure, monetary opt-outs weaken collective credibility.
The single currency is not only an economic instrument, but also a security one as well.
Second, Denmark should renounce its remaining opt-out in justice and home affairs. While partial participation has worked pragmatically, the current situation calls for coherence.
Membership in the euro and full participation in justice and home affairs will strengthen Denmark’s position at the core of European decision-making and internal security. These steps would not be concessions. They are investments in collective security.
Finally, and in parallel, leadership at the highest level is required.
The president of the European Council should urgently convene an extraordinary European Council dedicated to the threat to Greenland and European defence.
The agenda should be explicit: full backing to Denmark, readiness provide mutual assistance, and the implementation of Article 42.2 TEU for the construction of a genuine common defence.
Article 42.2 already provides the legal basis for a common defence policy leading to a common defence.
What has been missing is political will.
The Greenland question creates precisely the kind of moment that forces decisions. Either Europe treats its defence clauses as real, or it accepts strategic irrelevance.
A European deterrent presence, a credible commitment to Article 42.7, Greenland’s reintegration into the EU legal order, Denmark’s full participation in the Union, and a decisive push towards common defence form a coherent strategy. None of these measures alone may be sufficient.
Together, they change the strategic equation.
They raise the price of aggression, reduce uncertainty, and affirm that Europe is prepared to defend its member states and its constitutional order.
This is no marginal issue. it is a test. Europe should act accordingly.
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Domènec Ruiz Devesa is a senior researcher at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), a former Socialists & Democrats MEP, and president of the Union of European Federalists.
Domènec Ruiz Devesa is a senior researcher at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), a former Socialists & Democrats MEP, and president of the Union of European Federalists.