Borrell speaks out on the EU's 'double standards' on Gaza, and US tariff failure

In an interview with EUobserver in Madrid, former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell (78) reflects on Europe’s weak geopolitical weight, its divided and questionable response to the war in Gaza, strained transatlantic ties, and the uncertain future of the EU amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.

The veteran Catalan socialist served in various positions during his tenure in domestic Spanish politics, before stepping down in 1999 as leader of the opposition. He later shifted to European politics, serving as an MEP from 2004 to 2009, including two years as president of the European Parliament. He returned to national politics as Spain’s foreign minister from 2018 to 2019.

His five‑year tenure as the EU's top diplomat (2019-2024) was marked by a string of global crises, overseeing the bloc’s diplomatic response to the Covid-19 pandemic, rising tensions in the Middle East, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the 7 October Hamas attacks. He had a reputation in Brussels for speaking his mind or calling on EU delegations to report faster and more proactively.

But his record was not without controversy.

Borrell faced criticism in 2021 for a visit to Moscow and a press conference with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov that many viewed as diplomatically damaging. He speaks about this moment and about what he sees as the EU’s missed opportunities and future geopolitical challenges.

EUobserver: How do you evaluate the recent EU-US trade deal?

Borrell: From a political standpoint, the result is very bad. It gives the impression of weakness and submission to Trump’s demands. And it shows Europe can hardly be considered a strategically autonomous actor. 

The European Commission is selling it as the "least bad option.”

But I think it’s the result of a poor strategy — more a surrender than a negotiation. It follows the old strategy of bullies. The US threatened 30 percent tariffs, then offered 15 percent, and we’re expected to be grateful.

Germany and Italy, for example, got tariff reductions on cars. That matters to them. France is in a different position, and eastern countries another. But if the big three accept it, resistance is futile. We pursued a “smile and good manners” approach, hoping to melt Trump’s heart and got a balanced deal. But it didn’t work.

To what extent did the EU’s approach towards the previous Biden administration contribute to the erosion of current transatlantic relations?

Under Biden, we followed the US lead, especially on China. But Biden wasn’t hostile. Biden clearly accepted the commission president as his preferred counterpart. With Trump, even securing a meeting was hard.

The meeting [between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump] barely lasted an hour. That suggests it was already cooked, a sort of take-it-or-leave-it deal.

But the [tariffs] agreement is based on additional elements that are completely impossible to fulfil.

These were concessions to Trump, which he will later use against us, claiming we didn’t fulfil them —because we can’t fulfil them. For example, buying $750bn worth of gas over three years. That’s simply not feasible. The EU doesn’t buy gas, companies do. Same with weapons. And we say we want our own defence industry while promising to buy everything from the US. That’s a contradiction. The same as saying we have a green strategy while tripling gas purchases.

Given the recent statements from Trump, do you believe the US will not sell Ukraine and Europe to Putin now?

Trump only cares about Trump. If conceding to Russia benefits him, he’ll do it. If not, he won’t. He’s unpredictable. But he has already pushed narratives blaming Zelensky for the war and criticising Biden for aiding Ukraine. The big question is what he’ll do once the $60bn aid package runs out.

The big question for European society is: if the US stopped supporting Ukraine, could we or would we, which is not the same, continue supporting them in a way that makes up for the loss of American aid?

Do you see the war ending any time soon?

No, the war won’t end soon, for one very simple reason: because Putin is in no hurry. He has the human resources to sacrifice as many as needed. Ukraine doesn’t. It has a shortage of military manpower.

Russia still has resources, and it has China behind it, which supplies them with equipment — not weapons, but materials that can be converted into weapons. On top of that, they can bring in North Korean soldiers. They can also buy military equipment from North Korea, so Russia can prolong this for years. 

But Russia hasn’t won this war, because Zelensky is still in Kyiv. It hasn’t lost either, because it hasn’t been pushed out of the occupied territories. And Ukraine is in the reverse situation—it hasn’t won, because Russia is still there, but it hasn’t lost either. And that stalemate will depend heavily on both sides’ ability to endure—and especially on our willingness to help.

The big question for European society is: if the US stopped supporting Ukraine, could we or would we, which is not the same, continue supporting them in a way that makes up for the loss of American aid?

What would you do differently if Lavrov invited you again for a joint press conference?

At the time, I felt it was the moment to confront Russia directly over the trial of Navalny. I knew it was risky. Lavrov wasn't going to welcome me with a smile, but despite that, I believed I had to go because it was the right time and place to show support for Navalny and criticism of Russia.

Had I known beforehand, I probably wouldn’t have gone. But it was also a chance to deliver a clear message in Moscow. Navalny is now dead, and his resistance movement is exhausted, and that too is a factor enabling Putin to continue the war. Internally, there’s no opposition.

Lavrov also tried to corner me by comparing Navalny to Junqueras [a Catalan separatist]. I didn’t respond because I wasn’t there to debate Catalan separatism. And then the expulsion of European diplomats. During lunch in Moscow, I saw on Twitter that European diplomats had been expelled. Lavrov admitted it shouldn’t have been made public while I was still there. I couldn’t react to something I didn’t know about.

When it comes to Russian sanctions, Europe has had to deal in several occasions with Hungary’s veto. How can Orbán’s veto be broken in the future?

Sanctions are approved unanimously by EU countries. That’s how it is. We’re not going to change that, because it would require changing the treaties. That’s not going to happen. But it is not only sanctions. Since I left, there’s been no new military aid to Ukraine from the EU. The €6.6bn from the European Peace Facility are blocked because of Hungary. This was the end of this instrument. Everything will have to be bilateral now. And if Hungary refuses to renew sanctions, they can’t be renewed. We’re stuck.

Hungary also blocked sanctions on Israeli settlers and Hamas. Why was the EU so ineffective there?

Hungary blocked many of our proposals. Sanctions against violent settlers were very limited, maybe 20 people, despite clear evidence. We sanctioned thousands in Russia for less. Many member states simply don’t want to impose sanctions on Israel. That’s the reality.

The deaths in Bucha were counted in dozens. In Gaza, they’re counted in tens of thousands. There are horrors greater than others — and Gaza is one of them

Critics accuse the EU of double standards on Gaza. Is that fair?

Yes. What Netanyahu has done in Gaza surpasses many war crimes we've condemned. Tens of thousands have died. If Putin had done this, we’d have sanctioned him more severely. The deaths in Bucha were counted in dozens. In Gaza, they’re counted in tens of thousands. There are horrors greater than others — and Gaza is one of them.

Does Europe still have moral credibility in the Middle East?

No. We never had military weight. We used to have institutional weight, based on international law and the respect of human rights. That’s now gone. I don’t think any Arab leader is going to waste a single minute listening to a European argument based on respect for international law or humanitarian law. They would ask: “Who are you to lecture me?”

How did you feel when Israel called you antisemitic?

I’ve never officially been declared persona non grata, but yes in practice. I tried to visit Israel twice, but I was told no. Once, via Jordan, before the flight, the permit was revoked. And yes, I’ve been called antisemitic. But anyone who criticises the Israeli government gets that label. Arabs are Semites too. More accurately, they should say “anti-Jewish”. But being anti-Jewish is one thing and criticising what the Israeli government is doing is another entirely. It’s such a baseless accusation that it’s not even worth addressing.

Some justify inaction given the historical responsibility of Europe in the Holocaust. But the Palestinians didn’t kill the Jews

What do you think of the commission’s move to suspend Israel from the Horizon research program?

If that’s all they can come up with, it’s a joke, a bad joke. And EU member states have not even been able to approve it. Research funding isn’t Israel’s core interests. We need stronger measures. For instance, suspending the trade association agreement. But nothing can happen unless the commission proposes it — and then member states approve it. The commission can block action by not putting items on the agenda. And the commission hasn’t.

I also believe that Israeli society should pay a significant price for what the settlers are doing in the West Bank. I know that not all Israelis do this, but they allow it to happen. When the Oslo Accords were signed, there were approximately 100,000 settlers in the West Bank, and now there are over 700,000. According to international law, that’s illegal. For far less than this, we’ve removed visas for citizens of other countries.

Has von der Leyen’s presidential style been a barrier to imposing sanctions on Israel?

If she doesn’t put something on the agenda, it won’t be discussed. In five years that I was at the college of commissioners, voting wasn’t common. Everything came pre-decided. Some commissioners might want a real debate on Gaza, but it’s not happening.

Could the EU be seen as complicit in Gaza?

At some point, yes. A third of the bombs falling on Gaza are made in Europe. And there's a growing sense that inaction is starting to make us responsible for what’s happening. If Europe can’t act because some won’t allow it to, some are beginning to say: listen, someone has to be held accountable. But I don’t think it will stand in court. 

Anyway, people don’t care about procedural excuses. The feeling that exists today around the world, that Europe is not acting in the face of a clear case of massive human rights violations, is already coming at a cost.

Some justify inaction given the historical responsibility of Europe in the Holocaust. But the Palestinians didn’t kill the Jews. I’ve said that to my German colleagues. That guilt shouldn't justify allowing Palestinian civilians to be killed today.

What do you think of the current momentum to recognise Palestine?

It’s important, but it’s symbolic. Recognition indeed strengthens the Palestinian position under international law. But then what? Many countries already recognise it, especially from the East. Western states must follow. France could trigger a domino effect.

Is the two-state solution still viable?

It’s harder today than during the Oslo Accords. The Israeli movement sees this war as necessary. And a big part of the Israeli society thinks that the only solution is for Palestinians to leave or be exterminated. But we must keep pushing, through law, diplomacy, and international institutions. It’s the only solution we have.

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