The Greenland crisis is a trigger for Iceland and Norway to join EU bloc

The Trump administration’s claims on Greenland and its threats to the territorial integrity of Nato ally Denmark have shaken the Arctic’s security architecture.

Current European reactions to Washington’s pressure oscillate between panic, rallying around the protection of Danish sovereignty and the rules of international law, and attempts to alter US behaviour by strengthening Nato collective contribution to Arctic security.

Rather than remaining merely reactive, however, the EU should approach the Greenland crisis within Nato in a way that strengthens its own geopolitical posture, improves Arctic security, and potentially influences US actions by shaping its cost–benefit calculations. 

This can be achieved if the crisis is used as a strategic trigger to reinvigorate the Nordic enlargement of the European Union.

Iceland and Norway

The domestic political landscape in both potential candidate countries, Iceland and Norway, would be relatively receptive to relaunching political discussions on future EU membership.

Washington’s sabre-rattling has triggered a notable pro-EU shift in public opinion and party positions in both countries.

In Iceland, where the current government committed in 2024 to holding a plebiscite on relaunching Reykjavík’s EU bid by 2027 — a commitment reaffirmed by foreign minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir in January 2026 — recent opinion polls show a relative majority in favour of EU membership for the first time since 2015.

In Norway, while polls still indicate a relative majority opposing EU membership, support for accession has reached historically high levels since Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. A clear majority of Norwegians now support holding a new referendum, and the Conservative Party, under the leadership of Ine Eriksen Søreide, has begun framing Norway’s full EU membership as a strategic necessity.

The common thread in both debates is a shift away from predominantly domestic considerations toward arguments framing the EU as an existential geopolitical and security anchor, should Nato reliability erode as a result of American assertiveness toward Nuuk and Copenhagen.

This reframing fundamentally alters the political calculus around EU membership in both societies.

This growing susceptibility of Nordic societies and elites must be met with a determined, strategic, and proactive diplomatic and public relations campaign on the EU’s part.

EU institutions and member states must demonstrate that they are capable of playing geopolitics in a clever, strategic, and proactive manner, thereby sending a clear message to Washington that assertive behaviour may backfire.

Such behaviour may not only trigger geopolitical realignments in the Arctic that the current US administration would clearly disfavour, but could also result in an important public relations victory for Europe — highlighting the fundamental difference between a United States that relies on naked threats and generates opposition, and a European Union that can expand peacefully because it serves the fundamental interests of its members, is grounded in the rule of law, and remains committed to upholding the rules-based international order.

There are multiple rationales for the EU to pursue this path beyond merely responding to the United States and extending its footprint in the Arctic.

While candidate countries from the Western Balkans and Eastern Neighbourhood are often sceptical of Nordic enlargement, relaunching accession negotiations with Iceland and Norway could inject new momentum into the EU’s overall enlargement policy, to the benefit of long-standing candidate countries.

The accession of two net payer countries could shift public opinion in traditionally enlargement-skeptical member states such as France and the Netherlands, while also easing concerns over the EU’s continued eastward geopolitical shift. It could also accelerate the institutional reforms required to accommodate additional members, removing one of the key structural obstacles to further enlargement.

To seize the available window of opportunity, EU institutions and national capitals should immediately launch a diplomatic and public relations offensive to lock in the process.

The president of the European Council and the rotating presidency of the Council (Cyprus) should invite representatives of Iceland and Norway to all European Council meetings and council formations addressing Greenland and Arctic security. 

Related EU documents and European diplomatic language should begin referring explicitly to the EU Treaty’s mutual assistance clause (Article 42 (7) TEU) and to EU membership as a geopolitical and security anchor.

Arctic security summit

At the intergovernmental level, Scandinavian EU member states and Germany should initiate an Arctic Security Summit, bringing Iceland and Norway to the table alongside France, the United Kingdom, interested EU Member States and Canada to discuss the potential “Europeanization” of Arctic security. 

Building on the momentum created by the Lunna House Agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway, the E3 — Germany, France, and the United Kingdom — should offer bilateral defence treaties to Iceland and Norway, providing a politically significant safety net should Nato become paralysed.

While such steps would be perceived as hostile by the Trump administration, European capitals could, with a straight face, argue that they are merely responding to Washington’s repeated demands for greater European responsibility in Arctic security.

This effort should be complemented by parliamentary diplomacy, intensified public diplomacy, civil society exchanges, and enhanced think tank cooperation. The EU has an opportunity to go on the geopolitical offensive using its most consequential institutional tool: enlargement.

Missing it would be a strategic mistake.

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