Brussels has always been a spy capital. Nato and the EU headquarters have long made it a magnet for Chinese, Russian, and other hostile intelligence services. But this threat comes from within.
The European Commission is investigating allegations that Hungary ran a spy operation within EU institutions — not from a hostile foreign capital — but under Olivér Várhelyi's watch, who then served as Hungary's permanent representative (2015-2019). Várhelyi now serves as EU commissioner.
An investigation by Hungary's Direkt36, Germany's Der Spiegel, Austria's Der Standard, and Belgium's De Tijd reveals that as tensions escalated between Brussels and Budapest, Hungarian intelligence officers operated under diplomatic cover at Várhelyi's mission, aggressively recruiting Hungarian EU officials, obtaining non-public documents, and influencing commission reports critical of Orbán.
The network collapsed in 2017, yet these details emerge only now, with Várhelyi already in his second term as commissioner.
These allegations cast serious doubts on Várhelyi's suitability to serve in his current capacity under treaty obligations.
The alleged activities would appear fundamentally incompatible with the principle of independence required of all commissioners under Article 17(3) TEU and the duty of loyalty to the union enshrined in the Code of Conduct of Commissioners. Commissioners must act solely in the general interest of the union and refrain from any action incompatible with their duties.
While it remains unclear whether and to what extent Várhelyi was aware of espionage activities and which of his diplomats were involved, the question is not necessarily one of criminal culpability.
Rather, whether Várhelyi's position as superior to these intelligence officers, and his role as an end-user of their intelligence fundamentally compromised the principle of independence required of him as commissioner, since at least 2019 when he first sworn in as EU commissioner.
Even if he did not directly participate in operational matters, the mere perception of continued alignment with Budapest's interests over the union's general interest may be disqualifying.
The primary responsibility to vet and then oversee EU commissioners' fitness falls to the EU commission president, who must have the necessary confidence in each commissioner.
This is shared with the EU Parliament — and notably the Legal Affairs Committee and the ENVI/AGRI Committees — which greenlighted then-commissioner designate Várhelyi for the job.
Their public hearings last July were intended to assess, among other matters, his beyond-doubt independence, general competence, and European commitment as required by Article 17(3) of the Treaty.
The commission president holds decisive power here.
She can, at any time after taking office, compel the resignation of an individual commissioner. While this power has never been formally exercised, its mere threat led to the voluntary resignations of John Dalli and Phil Hogan.
In the first case, it was von der Leyen's predecessor, Jose Manuel Barroso, and in the latter, von der Leyen herself, who had de facto withdrawn confidence following reports of alleged misconduct during their mandates as commissioners.
Várhelyi's case is arguably more serious.
Unlike previous cases of commissioner misconduct —such as Dalli or Hogan — where improprieties occurred during their terms of office, the allegations against Várhelyi concern conduct predating his appointment and potentially vitiating his eligibility from the outset.
Should Várhelyi resist, he could be referred to the Court of Justice, which has powers to compulsorily retire him or strip his benefits - though the only precedent, commissioner Edith Cresson, resulted in no sanctions.
However, the institutional response could become particularly significant here: upon von der Leyen's demand, the commission may decide not to fill the vacancy.
This isn't merely a procedural option — it would be a strategic choice with implications extending until the end of this commission's mandate in 2029.
Leaving Várhelyi's post unfilled would serve multiple purposes. It would avoid rewarding Hungary with a replacement commissioner while questions about its loyalty to EU institutions remain unresolved.
It would signal that systematic espionage against EU institutions carries concrete institutional consequences.
It would also create a tangible cost for member states that treat the Union as hostile territory rather than a common project.
This may reveal yet another sanction in the EU's arsenal to hold its most rebellious countries accountable — not through the conventional Article 7 procedures that have proven politically impossible, but through the commission president's own powers over her college.
Yet there is an irony in the Várhelyi scandal.
Péter Magyar, the primary political opponent of Várhelyi's master — Hungary's PM Viktor Orbán — also served in the EU Permanent Representation of Hungary.
As his time at the permanent representation largely coincided with these aggressive intelligence operations and the establishment of the Information Office's special unit focused on the European Union, it is reasonable to question whether he knew.
The scandal may chase not only Várhelyi and Orbán, but Magyar too, thus revealing that it's Hungary's entire political class and system at risk of losing the EU's trust.
The ball is now in Ursula von der Leyen's court and in the hands of the European Parliament.
They must determine whether sufficient confidence exists between Várhelyi, the government that nominated him, the council that made his appointment, the commission president, and the parliament itself. That confidence is not a formality — it is the foundation upon which commissioner independence rests.
But the decision before them transcends one commissioner's fate. It poses a question the European Union has never had to answer so starkly: what happens when a member state treats the institutions it helped create not as a common project, but as hostile territory to be infiltrated and undermined?
The allegations against Várhelyi emerge against a backdrop of increasingly compromised commissioner independence.
Recent years have witnessed persistent concerns about commissioners maintaining overly close relationships with their national capitals, effectively re-nationalising an institution designed to transcend member state interests.
Yet Várhelyi's case represents something far more serious: where other commissioners may have informally coordinated with home governments, the alleged presence of intelligence operatives within his mission represents systematic institutional infiltration rather than mere policy alignment.
This case serves as a definitive stress test.
Either the union enforces the 'beyond doubt' standard of commissioner independence with meaningful consequences — including the unprecedented step of leaving Hungary's commissioner seat vacant — or it tacitly admits that this principle has become a polite fiction that member states may violate with impunity.
The decision will determine not just one commissioner's fate, but whether the EU's founding principle of institutional independence retains any real meaning when tested by a member state willing to spy on Brussels itself.
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Alberto Alemanno is an academic, author and one of the leading voices on the democratisation of the EU. He is Democracy Fellow at Harvard University, Jean Monnet Professor at HEC Paris and founder of The Good Lobby.
Alberto Alemanno is an academic, author and one of the leading voices on the democratisation of the EU. He is Democracy Fellow at Harvard University, Jean Monnet Professor at HEC Paris and founder of The Good Lobby.