Fortify EU's Russia sanctions — before 31 July deadline

EU commissioner for defence and space, Andrius Kubilius, has warned that Russia is already capable of producing four times more weapons than all Nato member states combined, including the United States.

Now imagine how this imbalance would escalate if Russia received a financial injection of €200bn — more than its entire war budget for 2025.

Unfortunately, this is no longer a theoretical concern but a very real risk that could materialise as early as of the end of July.

The immobilization of nearly €200bn in Russian Central Bank (RCB) assets is currently part of the EU sanctions regime, which is reviewed every six months and requires unanimous agreement to be continued.

The next review is scheduled for 31 July 2025.

If even a single EU member state — like Hungary, which regularly threatens to block the extension of sanctions — follows through on its blackmail, the freeze on these assets could be lifted, allowing Russia to immediately reclaim the funds.

There would be no way to reverse this decision. Money that could have helped to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction and bolster European security would instead fund more Russian tanks and missiles to kill Ukrainian children and return to Europe in the form of terrorism and sabotage.

Additionally, the EU would lose a key repayment source for the $50bn [€43.1bn] Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loan issued by the G7.

Even if European leaders succeed in persuading Viktor Orbán to support the sanctions' extension in July, the same threat will resurface in January.

Rather than heroically fighting and claiming victory in the same battle every six months, the EU must finally take decisive action to fortify its sanctions regime and focus on broader defence and security challenges across the continent.

Most importantly, EU sanctions are not merely a political gesture or an act of solidarity with Ukraine. They are legal measures designed to counter serious threats, establish reaction to violation of international law and must be treated as such. 

The general legal framework of the EU's external actions is laid down in articles 3 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). EU Council Decision 2022/335 explicitly states that Russia's actions constitute a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and pose a threat to international security. The EU had to respond to the Russian aggression.

Even if European leaders succeed in persuading Viktor Orbán to support the sanctions' extension in July, the same threat will resurface in January

Moreover, the EU's legal position has already been clearly established in case law.

The General Court of the EU has explicitly stated, for example, in decision on sanctions against Venezuela, that decisions in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are taken to ensure compliance with international law, the prohibition of torture, the protection of child rights, and other fundamental principles.

Secondly, contrary to widespread belief — including among many European officials we meet regularly — the time limitation of EU sanctions is not a legal requirement. It is a political choice.

Article 28(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) allows the council to set a duration for sanctions but does not oblige it to do so. The key criterion for reviewing a sanctions decision should not be an arbitrary date, but a meaningful change in circumstances. Sanctions should remain in force until their objectives are fully achieved. 

Spending nights in metro stations in Kyiv to shelter from ballistic bombardments, we haven’t noticed the meaningful change in circumstances equal to Russia ceasing its aggression. Then how can there be any serious talks about potential lifting of sanctions?

The council of the EU official guidelines on imposition of restrictive measures outlines two possible approaches to sanctions duration:

Renewing the sanctions decision if the council of the EU determines that its objectives have not yet been achieved, and repealing the decision if the council concludes that its objectives have been met.

While the second approach is explicitly presented as preferable, it has not been applied in practice, unfortunately.

Yet these two approaches are fundamentally different.

Reverse the 'burden of proof' onto Orbán

Under the second model, if Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán wanted to lift the sanctions, the burden would be on him to convince the other member states that Russia has stopped bombing Ukrainian children in their beds — not the other way around, as it currently stands.

So why are sanctions against Russia based on the weakest possible model?

The reason is purely political — all necessary legal tools exist to remove the automatic expiry mechanism and adopt the “in force until objectives are achieved” model, which is clearly outlined in the EU documents.

If the EU is unwilling to change its overall approach, then at the very least the duration of sanctions should be significantly extended.

Did you know that the first EU sanctions package against Russia in 2014 was adopted for 12 months before being reviewed? Ironically, the EU later decided to shorten the revision period to six months — apparently, to make sure that they don’t miss if Russia’s aggression could suddenly end without anyone noticing.

Therefore, if the EU manages to succeed with Plan A — that is, to prolong sanctions by unanimous decision in July — it must seize the momentum to build in additional safeguards to protect against future sabotage from within.

The review period should be extended from the current six months to a minimum of 36–48 months. If Russia were to end its aggression and agree to pay reparations sooner, the council of the EU could always conduct an extraordinary review and lift sanctions ahead of schedule. 

Moreover, the status quo on frozen Russian assets should also be changed before it’s too late.

To be secured from being reclaimed by Russia in case of lifting sanctions, in order to generate much bigger profits through active management, this money should be transferred to a separate Trust Fund with Ukrainian participation in decision-making, which may possibly be located in Brussels, and work to the maximum extent for Ukraine’s defence, reconstruction and compensation for victims. 

Since Slovak prime minister Robert Fico traveled to Moscow last month to attend the 9 May parade, and Romania narrowly avoided falling into Russia’s embrace, we must acknowledge a growing danger: the longer the EU delays in strengthening its sanctions regime, the longer the list of member states willing to engage in 'hostage diplomacy' over sanctions may grow.

We call on the European Union institutions to urgently adopt a sanctions framework that remains in force until its objectives are fully achieved, and to establish robust legal and financial mechanisms that will prevent Russia from reclaiming its frozen assets under any circumstances and will ensure this money works for Ukraine much more effectively.

This article is based on the analytical brief - EU Sanctions: Legal Nature And Discretion Over Their Duration And Renewal 

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