The EU’s plan to finally cut off Russian gas imports is facing mounting resistance from within the bloc, as legal threats, long transition periods and enforcement loopholes risk prolonging Europe’s financial ties to Moscow four years after the invasion of Ukraine.
Despite Brussels’ pledge to end reliance on Russian fossil fuels, member states could still send billions of euros to the Kremlin before the phase-out takes effect — and some governments appear determined to delay it even further.
The EU commission sought to end the bloc’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels since Moscow launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022. Russian gas still accounts for 13 percent of the EU imports in 2025, sending Moscow €15bn last year.
The phase-out, announced in May 2025, derived from the REPowerEU plan launched in May 2022 as well as 17 sanctions packages imposed on Russia.
Under the new rules, imports of Russian LNG will end by the beginning of 2027, while a ban on pipeline gas will apply from 30 September 2027, with a final deadline of 1 November 2027.
However, the excessive reliance on national authorities exposes the bloc to gas laundering practices, while leaving hope for the political swingback.
“It's a process of biding time,” Martin Vladimirov, the director of the energy and climate programme at the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD), told EUobserver.
According to Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), the block could import as much as an estimated €5.5bn worth of Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) and €7.9bn worth of pipeline gas before the phase-out deadlines, assuming prices remain at 2025 levels.
“Russian gas could have been phased out on 1 January 2026. There is an ample supply of alternative gas that would have filled the gap,” Vladimirov told EUobserver.
The European Commission warned that an immediate ban could trigger sudden market disruptions and sharp spikes in energy prices. It also acknowledged that landlocked countries, such as Hungary and Slovakia, require time to secure alternative supplies and develop the infrastructure needed to phase out pipeline gas.
Both Hungary and Slovakia have consistently opposed the phase-out and have vowed to challenge the REPowerEU regulation before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), accusing Brussels of breaching its own rules.
“We cannot accept solutions that fail to reflect the real capacities and specific circumstances of individual countries. Therefore, we will turn to the ECJ and initiate proceedings aimed at annulling the REPowerEU regulation on the ban on imports of Russian energy,” Slovakia's foreign and European affairs minister Juraj Blanár said in a statement on Monday (26 January).
“We will use every legal means to have it annulled,” Hungary’s foreign affairs minister, Péter Szijjártó, also announced on X.
Hungary could launch legal proceedings as early as next week, an official told EUobserver.
Despite the overall EU reduction of Russian gas imports, Hungary expanded its long-term contract with Gazprom in 2024, aiming to use the TurkStream pipeline as its primary supply route.
Slovakia has also maintained business as usual, with Slovakian prime minister Robert Fico arguing that a total cutoff could lead to severe shortages and higher prices, and has sought to use EU funds to stabilise bills.
According to Vladimirov, Moscow-friendly states could further slow implementation in the hope that a future resolution of the war in Ukraine would reopen the door to renewed Russian gas supplies.
But all EU member states in central and southeastern Europe can fully replace the Russian gas volume, according to CSD research.
In the meantime, the exemption period until 1 January 2027 for LNG and 30 September 2027 for pipeline imports under long-term contracts substantially benefits national gas trading companies, often linked to the political establishment of the importing countries, such as MYTILINEOS and DEPA in Greece, and MVB in Hungary.
“These companies benefit from buying cheap Russian gas, reselling it at a premium rate at the local exchanges. Basically, the profit is pocketed by a few traders with access to it,” said Vladimirov.
EU member states are expected submit plans by 1 March 2026, outlining how they will eliminate Russian gas imports, with fines for violations.
Even though on paper the regulation strengthens the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) investigative capacities, it puts most of the monitoring and enforcement responsibilities onto national authorities.
The "prior authorisation" clause will require Russian gas claiming an exception to be approved one month before entry, and five days for non-Russian gas.
At high-risk entry points, all natural gas will be presumed to be Russian. Companies must provide refuting evidence at least seven working days before entry.
While the regulation is “technically feasible,” it will not be sufficient, as documentation can be manipulated, while complex supply chains, swaps, and storages make upstream verification difficult, concluded CREA.
“The customs authorities will receive the documents, and then what? Will they initiate investigation to challenge them? In seven days?,” Vladimirov said.
In addition, entry points such as Kipi at the Greek-Turkish border, which are not subject to the stricter rebuttable presumption, allow loopholes which companies can exploit to sneak in Russian gas into the bloc without much scrutiny, according to CREA.
In 2024, state-owned importer BOTAŞ, which controls most of gas flows in Turkey, introduced a so-called ‘Turkish blend’ — a mix of Iranian, Azeri, and Russian gas, sold as Turkish.
“When the customer authorities ask for documents confirming that no Russian gas is mixed in, BOTAŞ will claim that the gas that they export is predominantly Azeri. The truth of the matter is that this is impossible to trace, ” said Vladimirov. The CSD doubts those claims will be challenged.
“We have seen multiple cases of bad actors seeking major profits and laundering Russian oil, labelling it as non-Russian through fraudulent origin certificates or ship-to-ship transfers before it enters the EU. I am confident the same will happen with gas,” Europe-Russia policy and energy analyst at CREA, Isaac Levi, told EUobserver.
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Eva Hilinski is a Ukrainian journalist, based in Belgium, writing on European politics and security. She is a reporter at The Brussels Times.
Eva Hilinski is a Ukrainian journalist, based in Belgium, writing on European politics and security. She is a reporter at The Brussels Times.