How the rightwing in Czech Republic and Hungary is targeting Ukrainian refugees

Fuelled by misinformation spread by politicians about Ukrainians exploiting social welfare systems , anti-Ukrainian sentiment is on the rise across Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania.

This backlash is fuelled by social tensions and nationalist rhetoric, leading to increased polarisation, public hostility, and in some cases, the risk of discriminatory policies or acts targeting Ukrainians seeking refuge or employment.

‘Poland first, Poles first’

Earlier in August, Polish president Karol Nawrocki vetoed an amendment to the law on aid for Ukraine.

He publicly voiced his opposition to a provision that would provide child benefits only to those Ukrainians who work and pay taxes in Poland.

"The law on aid to Ukrainian citizens does not stipulate this. (...) I believe that is wrong. Poland first, Poles first” is not just an election slogan," he said, referring to his campaign promise.

However, according to a Deloitte report for the National Bank of Poland, 78 percent of Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland are employed. Ukrainians contributed 15 billion PLN (Polish złoty) [€3.52bn] to the Polish economy and contributed to a 2.7 percent increase in GDP.

In contrast, the 800+ benefit payments to them cost the economy only 2.8 billion PLN.

On this issue, Nawrocki, the presidential candidate for the nationalist rightwing PiS (Law and Justice) party, shares similar views to Konfederacja party politicians, who make similar demands.

This is a trend of other political parties throughout Europe with similar ideological and agenda-driven stances.

Babiš and the extreme right

In the Czech Republic, a month away from parliamentary elections, Andrej Babiš’ Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) is leading in the polls by 32 percent, competing — with anti-Ukrainian slogans — with Tomi Okamura's far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party, on 12 percent.

In June, Okamura criticised the idea of granting maternity pay to Ukrainian women living in the Czech Republic.

"The Fiala [Petra, Czech prime minister] government intends to rob Czech families of their money and give it to Ukrainian families? That's crazy," Okamura said.

A few days later, Babiš virtually repeated the same thing.

"The government is introducing maternity leave for Ukrainian women. You heard right. So nothing for Czech mothers, and everything for Ukrainian women. It is clear that Fiala is fighting for Ukraine, and certainly not the Czech Republic," said the former prime minister in a video.

There are two myths spread widely in Czech society by populists and the far-right. One is that Ukrainian refugees are treated better than Czech citizens. The other is that Ukrainians are wealthy enough that they do not need help, or that they have come from regions where there is no war.

Myths about Ukrainian refugees alive and kicking

The first myth most likely comes from the fact that the Czech Republic was especially involved in helping Ukrainian refugees during the first year of the full-scale invasion.

They were entitled to free public transport, their children were guaranteed school places, and those who took in Ukrainian families received compensation from the state almost equal to that of market rates for hotels.

Many Czechs believe that Ukrainians are still receiving these privileges.

Politicians from the aforementioned ANO, SPD, and pro-Russian party Stacilo (‘Enough’, on eight percent) are taking advantage of this sentiment.

As part of their campaign, Okamura's ANO party is promising to deport all Ukrainian refugees who are not in full-time work. Babiš, albeit slightly more moderate on this issue, also wants to win over rightwing voters.

He proposes ‘only’ sending back those who are not in work at all: if they have a casual job, they can remain in the Czech Republic. He also vows to make sure that Ukrainians are not generally favoured over Czechs.

Some hard facts

The facts, however, do not support the narrative that Ukrainians are favoured by the state when it comes to support.

There are 373,000 Ukrainian refugees registered in the Czech Republic, of which only 89,000 receive benefits; of those, half are children, one third are pensioners, and the rest are people with disabilities and women on maternity pay.

Half of the refugees are employed and do not receive any benefits. In the Czech Republic, the benefits amount to €180, about €10 less than the minimum support provided to unemployed Czech citizens.

The data also shows that the Czech economy is benefiting significantly from Ukrainian refugees.

In the first quarter of this year, total expenditure on refugees amounted to €155m, while they paid €286m in taxes during the same period.

In the Czech Republic, the pre-election coalition ‘Enough!’ brings together part of the leftwing around the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as various other movements, often ultra-nationalist, and focuses on criticising military support for Ukraine.

The ruling coalition in the Czech Republic, ‘Together’, began supplying weapons to Kyiv at the beginning of the invasion.

And non-partisan president Petr Pavel has assembled a coalition of countries that have supplied Ukraine with over two million pieces of artillery ammunition.

Orbán's slanted referendum

In Hungary, politicians are focusing on the same issue, as well as the (still theoretical) question of Ukraine's accession to the European Union.

The government of Viktor Orbán conducted a nationwide poll on the issue in June. The letter sent to every household began by stating that Ukraine's accession would be an economic blow to Hungary and that it would contribute to a worse standard of living for its citizens, going on to highlight that crime would increase in the country.

It also claims that millions of Ukrainians will have to be paid pensions belonging to Hungarians.

The government claims to have received two million completed questionnaires back, in which 95 percent of Hungarians expressed their disagreement with Ukraine's accession to the European Union.

However, Peter Magyar, leader of the opposition TISZA party, claims, citing sources in the Hungarian postal service, that only half a million completed questionnaires were returned to the government.

Neither he nor Fidesz are able to provide evidence to support these claims.

'Russian propaganda remains extremely aggressive, and those who support it, regardless of their political affiliations, are very vocal'

In Hungary, the Ukraine question is politically sensitive. In 2022, a misrepresented statement by then-opposition leader Peter Marki Zay about allegedly sending Hungarian troops to war with Russia greatly damaged his campaign.

Many of Magyar's supporters interpret his recent statements with caution.

In an interview with Gazeta Wyborcza in August, he stated that it was Ukrainian politicians who contributed to the deterioration of relations with Hungary, and not the other way around, asking: "If you have been at war for so long, does it make sense to upset your neighbour by putting pressure on the Hungarian minority and taking away their rights?"

This is one of the few public statements he has made on Ukraine. The leader of TISZA is mindful not to broach this subject in Hungary, aware that it could be exploited by the propaganda machine of Orbán's party, Fidesz.

In recent years, Viktor Orbán's government has done everything in its power to discourage people from seeking asylum in Hungary. According to UNICEF, there are currently 61,000 Ukrainians in the country, 47,000 of whom have only temporary protection.

Anti-Ukrainian sentiment on the rise in Romania

In Romania, only 21 percent of respondents to a survey perceived Ukrainian immigrants as a major threat. And yet, a shift in public attitude against Ukrainians is noticeable there, too.

In September 2023, 64 percent of Romanians believed that Russia should withdraw its army and return the occupied territories to Ukraine. This percentage has now fallen to 56 percent.

There has also been an increase in willingness to cede occupied territories to Russia, which stood at 24 percent two years ago, compared to 33 percent now.

"If this trend continues, these percentages are likely to reverse, though it is not certain. Nevertheless, Russian propaganda remains extremely aggressive, and those who support it, regardless of their political affiliations, are very vocal," said Remus Stefureac, founder of the renowned INSCOP institute, which conducted the study.

According to him, the 21 percent of respondents who consider Ukrainian emigration to be a major threat are becoming the perfect target for extremist parties — and could tip the balance for parties seeking to seize power.

Earlier in September, the EU agreed to extend temporary protection for millions of Ukrainians who cannot return to their country until March 2027.

This text was produced as part of the PULSE project, a European initiative supporting international journalistic cooperation. It was translated by Stephen Gamage (Voxeurop).

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