Lukashenko opens window of opportunity for Western influence

In recent weeks the Belarusian regime has been indicating that it does not feel comfortable in the situation in which it has found itself.

Aleksandr Lukashenko, who on July 20 celebrated the 30th anniversary in power, reshuffled his team and appointed the new head of the presidential administration, the new minister of foreign affairs and the new ambassador to Russia. 19 political prisoners were released.

The flow of migrants on the Belarusian-Polish border has decreased. Whereas the Belarusian ministry of foreign affairs signalled its readiness to start a dialogue with Poland, Lukashenko himself urged to find ways to restore cooperation with the EU.

To the surprise and dissatisfaction of Moscow, Minsk introduced visa-free travel for citizens of 35 countries, including members of Nato and EU.

Most importantly, Lukashenko withdrew additional troops from the border with Ukraine deployed there only weeks ago.

Although most of these measures look externally oriented, the primary reason for taking them might well be domestic.

Quite plausibly, we are witnessing preparations for a snap presidential election, which, according to the law, can be held any moment before 20 July 2025. 

The timing simply cannot be better for that. 

First, the geopolitical context is favourable. Relations with Russia are stable and predictable. What the Kremlin needs is Belarus’s territory, airspace and infrastructure, but not the troops, which are minuscule in the scale of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

In turn, the West is currently approaching Belarus just as an extension of Russia.

Western policymakers have neither a strategic vision for Belarus as an independent entity, nor interest in the country’s affairs.

It took the EU nearly a year to design and adopt the latest package of sanctions against Belarus, but their focal point seems to be border restrictions, which affect ordinary Belarusians more than the regime. 

Second, Lukashenko has enlarged his domestic manoeuvring space. Massive repressions are not the only factor to be taken into consideration.

While repressions did help to thwart domestic opposition and regain control, they could not restore the domestic legitimacy of the regime.

To reach this goal, Lukashenko successfully instrumentalised and manipulated the societal fear to be directly involved into the war in Ukraine.

The propaganda machinery constructed and spread the narrative of Belarus’s non-participation in the war being the regime’s achievement, simultaneously portraying the West as an aggressor. 

Third, the Belarusian opposition is not ready for the elections.

Instead of re-establishing channels of communication with the people inside Belarus and explaining why their problems stem directly from Lukashenko’s assistance to Russia in its aggression against Ukraine, democratic forces abroad have been spending time and energy on internal power struggle and preserving their status in the West. 

The “travel diplomacy” of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, and her multiple top-level meetings, however, did not help the émigré community to deal with bureaucratic problems they face daily, such as the renewal of passports or residence permits.

Moreover, both the above-mentioned latest round of Western sanctions against Belarus and the unilateral release of the political prisoners further dent the credibility of the Belarusian opposition, which has made these issues the cornerstone of their agenda but in reality, can do little on both accounts.

On a separate note, the regime in Minsk cannot take it for granted that its economic resources will remain the same a year from now and that the situation will not worsen considerably as a result of sanctions or Russia’s reluctance to maintain the current level of subsidies.

This is another important reason to hold the elections ahead of schedule.

Implicitly, Lukashenko’s campaign has already started. His recent demonstrations of the “peace-loving position” aim to anchor him as the only actor who can prevent the war’s coming to Belarus.

Re-composition of the power vertical is intended to guarantee a problem-free election success. The new head of the presidential administration Dmitry Krutoy has already begun touring the country on Lukashenko’s assignment.

The forthcoming presidential election in Belarus may be the final opportunity for the opposition and its partners in the West to reconnect with Belarusian society.

Due to their anti-war position, Belarusian people are a natural ally of the West. Many of them demonstrated in 2020 that they care about Belarus’s future as a democracy.

Yet, they now increasingly feel abandoned and having no choice but to go with what they consider to be a known evil. 

The West should not only be reminding the Belarusians of the dangers of Lukashenko’s course but show them an alternative.

Belarusians should know what kind of an offer would be awaiting their country in case it starts economic and political reforms.

The failure to do so will mean a continuation of the dictatorial rule in Belarus for now and a risk of internal destabilisation or annexation by Russia in the not-so-distant future.