What this week's Belarus-Russia military drill tells us about Lukashenko's new posturing

The Russian-Belarusian bilateral “Zapad” exercises, which Belarus hosts once every four years, usually attract a lot of attention.

“Zapad-2017” was viewed by analysts as a preparation of the absorption of the country by Russia. “Zapad-2021” served as a cover for the then forthcoming Russia’s invasion into Ukraine.

In comparison, “Zapad-2025” that took place on 12-16 September, received a lot less visibility.

Nato countries, of course, took measures to guarantee security in the alliance’s eastern flank. They carried out a series of exercises, “Iron Defender-2025” in Poland being the largest one.

In response to Russia’s sending the drones into Polish airspace on the eve of Zapad, also via Belarusian airspace, Warsaw closed both the land border with Belarus — until further notice — and the air in the vicinity of this border. Latvia and Lithuania repeated the latter step.

Yet, the political resonance around “Zapad-2025” was fairly small.

That reflects the minuscule size of the games.

In the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides of the frontline, 8,000 Belarusian military and 2,000 men arriving from Russia to be directly involved in the exercises, do not look formidable at all.

De-escalation?

The main intrigue of “Zapad-2025”, however, manifested itself through an attempt by the Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko to exploit it to start the process of de-escalation of relations with the West.

In August, Belarus loudly pre-announced the move of the exercises into the centre of the country, away from its southern or western borders. Furthermore, during the above-mentioned drone provocation against Poland, Minsk demonstrated its “goodwill” and shared some information with Warsaw.

Lukashenko made an odd statement that the main task of Belarusian diplomacy should now be helping US president Donald Trump to bring about peace.

Finally, on 11 September, Minsk released 52 political prisoners in exchange for the lifting of the US sanctions against Belavia, the Belarusian national airline — apparently in hope to shift the attention away from security towards the humanitarian agenda and emphasise that his regime is ready to negotiate with the West in general, and Washington in particular.

This Minsk activity reveals that Lukashenko finds his current situation threatening.

Western economic sanctions work. Exports of key Belarusian revenue-generating commodities, like potassium, are grossly impeded.

Attempts to induce China to deepen economic ties failed — the opposite happened.

The closure of the Polish border, if it continues, will be another major blow — this time affecting what was left from the Asian transit.

In the meantime, Russia, while ordering and paying for the products of the Belarusian military industry, neither wants nor has the resources to subsidise Lukashenko’s regime at the level seen before 2022, and multiple meetings with Putin cannot change this reality.

Minsk outshone by North Korea and China

Most importantly, Lukashenko no longer enjoys the status of Russia’s closest partner and ally. Unlike North Korea, Belarus does not send its military units to fight alongside Russia’s. Unlike China, it does not have the economic or political weight to make a difference in today’s diplomatic bouts. 

In other words, the label of “co-aggressor”, which in 2022-23 Lukashenko was boasting to have, by now has become a burden.

Minsk is trying to repeat the trick which had worked many times before — namely, to re-engage with the West and thus to enlarge its own manoeuvring space vis-à-vis Russia.

However, this time it is not likely to succeed.

In 2020, Europe had its fingers burnt: Lukashenko did not hesitate to throw off all the results of bilateral rapprochement of 2015-20 and stay in power relying on massive repression. At the moment, Europeans would expect not simply a release — and deportation, as it happens now — of relatively small groups of political prisoners, but substantial domestic liberalisation. 

Moreover, nothing can today change the image of Lukashenko in the West as Putin’s vassal.

In contrast to 2019, the nature of his relationship with Moscow has changed profoundly and not in his favour.

Even if the Belarusian leader abruptly decided to stop using the migrants as a hybrid weapon against Europe and find a way to resolve an acute crisis in Polish-Belarusian relations, this would not guarantee the recognition of Lukashenko’s domestic legitimacy and Minsk as an international actor by the EU.

Europe cannot simply turn the page the way Donald Trump’s administration may intend to do. Minsk would need to revert the strategic subordination to Moscow in the way convincing for Europe. But such a change of tack is completely unrealistic, and the best proof of it is the calm with which Moscow is watching a new episode of the saga about Lukashenko’s 'drift to the West'.

Most likely, Lukashenko has been left with only two scenarios and neither is in his hands.

One is to fall 'between two stools' — being ostracised by Europe while not sufficiently propped up by Russia.

The other one is more radical and implies the replacement of Lukashenko by someone more to Moscow’s liking. 

All in all, the West may be advised to start preparing for a new political and security crisis in Europe — this time in and around Belarus. 

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